Based on the recent unrest that has been precipitated by the Oromo people in Ethiopia, a number of observers such as Davison, 2015; Muindi, 2016; and Borago, 2016, have argued that the Addis Ababa Master Plan has not only undermined self-determination but also contributed to a further loss of autonomy and the marginalization of Oromos living on the outskirts of the Federal capital, Addis Ababa. As stated by the European Parliament (1, 21, 2016): for the past two months,
…Ethiopia’s largest region, Oromia, has been hit by a wave of mass protests over the expansion of the municipal boundary of the capital, Addis Abba, which has posed risks of eviction for farmers from their land.

Initially, the Ethiopian Government argued that it planned to use its Master Plan to expand the limits of the Federal City of Addis Ababa into the Oromo Regional State. Agitators believe there are hidden motives in this plan. Countering the attacks, Ethiopian Government Officials and their surrogates argue that the strategic plan depicted in the Addis Ababa Master Plan is nothing but a topographic sketch meant to enhance and foster the development of both Addis Ababa and the Oromo Regional States.That is, with the expansion of Addis Ababa to include lands that belong to the Oromos, it was assumed that this would contribute substantial direct and spillover benefits to both regions. In addition, if the plan were implemented, the government has stated that any evicted farmers in the Oromo Region might be given reasonable compensation.

Araia (2016) candidly asserts that the Addis Ababa-Oromia Integrated Master Plan is not by any means related to ‘land garp’. However, he Araia persuasively criticizes the EPRDF governing party for the “1) lack of transparency: the government should have clearly and openly explained the nature and characteristics of the Integrated Master Plan; 2) lack of peaceful resolution to the crisis once the people (mostly youth) in the Oromia region began protesting …”.

While there is a long way to go before achieving the intricately designed Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian constitution, the magnitude of the Oromo uprising has given a plausible signal for the possibility of secession or the dismemberment of the Oromo Region from Ethiopia’s political landscape. Given these debatable views, the questions that need to be posed at this juncture are: Besides self-determination and/or secession, does Article 39 as codified in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution allow for a possible expansion or at the extreme amalgamation of regional states in Ethiopia? Did the respective regional communities or their representatives effectively bargain for their interests, express their grievances, and divulge their aspirations before the Addis Ababa Master Plan was designed? To examine thesepivotal questions, the content of Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution is briefly reviewed.

The Structure of the Ethiopia’s Polity
After dismantling the brutal and authoritarian Derg regime in 1991, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), led by the Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), subdivided the Ethiopian polity into nine autonomous regional statesand two federally administered city states. In the second phase that started in 2001, the EPRDF further embarked on the devolution of powers and responsibilities of the woreda,or lower level of administration. As highlighted by Assefa (2015),the 1991 manifestation of decentralization was aimed at creating and empowering national and regional states of governments, whereas as the second phase of decentralization extended the devolution of powers to the woreda.

A number of people supporting centralized states warned against devolution, because it might serve as the ‘Trojan horse to independence.’ Others were concerned that extending devolution to Ethiopian localities might cause major inequalities with regard to economic development, taxes, opportunities and administrative performances.Thus, from the start, Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution faced a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of criticisms. Merera (2003), for instance, strongly argues that the application of Article 39 would wipe the state of Ethiopia from the political map of the world. Fleiner (2006), warned that if self-determination, up to and including secession, as warranted in Article 39 of the federal constitution, is seriously implemented, the viability and existence of Ethiopianfederal states is likely to become highly questionable. Actually, Ethiopia is a heterogeneous or multicultural society.The fact that the then Transitional Government in Ethiopia by and large used homogenous ethnic denominations to subdivide Ethiopia and restructure Ethiopia into different political regions was less controversial than the inclusion of Article 39 in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution.

Article 39 includes various impediments to its application. For example, it renders an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right of secession to regional states, as follows:a) a demand for secession has been approved by two-thirds majority of the members of the regional parliament, b) the federal government arranges for a nation-wide plebiscite within 3 years after receiving the demand for secession, and c) the demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum.

As shown above, Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution was vaguely worded. It also includes clearing various insurmountable impediments before it is implemented. Intuitively Article 39 appeared appealing not only to emotionally charged ethnic groups but also to those who were infatuated with Lenin’s concept of the “National Question” issue because it used to be the driving slogan of the Ethiopian student movement in the late 1960s. A sober examination of Article 39 gives an impression that it might have been purposely included in the 1994 Constitution not with the intention of granting ultimate secession rights to a regional stateof Ethiopia after referendum is consummated, but rather to be used as a tactical selling point to lure members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) into remaining participants in the Ethiopian political union. With this in mind, it would make sense to assume that although the other regional groups didn’t ask for it, the exercise of self-determination was imposed on them, even their right to declare for secession, if their conditions were to become inhumane and excessively intolerable.

A case in point is that history tells us that the former Soviet Union subscribed to Lenin’s politically designed concept of the “National Question,” and pronounced the right of self- determination in its constitution, but the member states never acted to secede or separate from the Soviet Union during its tenure.The most glaring aspect of secessionism is that though China included the right to secede in its constitution of 1931, after China was fully consolidated, it had to remove it from its Constitution when the Chinese Constitution was revised in 1975 (kreptul, A. 2003).

It is known that the value of geographical and economic ties and the advantages of a big market and big state induce economic of scale and efficiency. Based on this economic premise, Lenin might have argued that the masses resort to secession only when national oppression and national friction make joint life absolutely intolerable and hinder them from all economic intercourse the masses (Lenin cited by Dixon, 2016).Thus, contradicting those who opposed self-determination and the freedom to secede as stated in Article 39 of the Ethiopian 1994 Constitution, as an ardent supporter of the Lenin’s persuasive ideology, the EPRDFforcefully defended Lenin’s position for self-determination and secession. As articulated by the ideologies of the EPRDF, democratic federalism increases self-government and political participation. Therefore, instead of dismantling the Ethiopian Federal state, the EPRDF ideologies forcefully claimed that Article 39 would consolidate and harmonize all groups of Ethiopia and provide for a better life. Given this contextual argument, the question that needs to be addressed here is: Has the creation of a democratic federal structure ever advanced the formation of self-government and political participation, or created uncorrupt systems of governance at the local or woreda level in Ethiopia?

Before assessing the status of democracy in Ethiopia, it is worth looking at some of the basic elements of democracy. Among other things, as a system of government, democracy includes: 1) a political system of competition of power that is based on free election- such that those in authority are selected, monitored , and replaced, 2) the active participation of the people, as citizens, in political and civic life, 3)consensus-oriented decision making process, 4) accountability and transparency, 5) the tenets of human rightsprinciples, and 6) the existence of a rule of law that applies equally to all citizens (See, UNESCAP 2010; UNDP 2002; and World Bank, 2007). Bearing some of elements of this framework, let us look at the status of democracy in Ethiopia.

The Status of Democracy in Ethiopia

Two decades after the implementation of federalism in Ethiopia, Turton’s (2005:92-93) assessment of the Ethiopian political space indicates that Ethiopia, which was on the brink of collapse during the centrist feudal monarchy and the unitary military dictatorship, there structuring of Ethiopia as an ethnic-based federation has been an undeniable success. Although some internal and external opposition groups occasionally trigger some form of violence, it is manageable. Currently, Ethiopia provides peace and security for the great majority of the population and is reasonably stable. Similarly, an analysis of the implementation of Ethiopia’s federalism bythe World Bank reveals that Ethiopia:

…has embarked on a bold and thoughtful process of decentralization, which has been supported by a widely shared consensus over both the development strategy and objectives, and very large transfers of united resources from the federal government to the regions. At this point the system is unquestionably working well (1999).

However more specifically, on the status of democracy in Ethiopia, the Africa Report (2009) claims that the dominance of one party behind the façade of regional and local autonomy and an extensive patronage system have severely hampered such a utopian view and the proclamation of democratic rhetoric has not been matched by democratic practice. In actuality, the African Report states that the Ethiopian type of Federalism has allowed new ethnic elites to emerge but has not fundamentally altered the principle of the elite-based paternalistic politics of the past.

As it stands, Ethiopia’s democracy is represented as a plan-oriented development process. The current Ethiopian organization structure is ruled by paternalistic political rule. Instead of power flowing from the people to the leaders, the EPRDF controls the government. The existing bureaucracy is managed by civil servants, functionaries that are primarily members of the political party. The 1994 Constitution is supposed to provide for a multiparty electoral system to promote political choice and guarantee the democratic rights of the all Ethiopian people. However, Araia’s (2013) observation seems to indicate that Ethiopia is led by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that has been reluctant to reconcile democracy and government.

In every election, the opposition political parties in Ethiopia have complained of harassment and intimidation. As ascertained by the Africa Development Bank (2009), opposition parties perceive an absence of a level playing field, attributing the outcome of the electoral process to have narrowed the democratic space.The electoral process appears to lack administration by a neutral and professional body that treats all political parties equally.

It is pivotal that citizens in a democratic system participate in public life. Also, participation comes not only in public services but arises through active membership in civic affairs. However, a cursory look at the Ethiopian local (woreda) levels shows that residents are hardly empowered. They have not been able to participate meaningfully in selecting their representatives for public offices, except when the outcome is a forgone conclusion.The local people do not have the right to choose their leaders. In name, all local (woredas) are supposed to be autonomous and the leaders are chosen by the local people, however, the zone governors, mayors, and killel leaders are carefully chosen by the ruling party from the hard core cadres of the governing party. As observed, this kind of system has encouraged voter apathy and has allowed the existing ruling party to perpetuate its power.

A case in point is this. During the last election in 2015, some of the federal members of parliament were never endorsed by their constituents and never went to their local areas to present their agendas for the future. To add insult to injury, some of the candidates never cared to listen to the concerns of their constituents. Being faithful and accountable to their political party, the cadres were endorsed; a green signal was given to the constituent units to elect them rather than encouraging the local people to be active members of the election process (Desta, 2015). This clearly indicates that the citizens of Ethiopia are being denied their basic rights. Democracy entails abiding by a system of rule by laws, and not by individuals or parties. Therefore, if Ethiopia wants to exist as a viable country, the political climate needs to be competitive and the existing ruling party needs to stimulate voters to entertain many options. This would rekindle reforms in Ethiopia’s polity.

Building a democracy out of the ruins of a brutal dictatorship and highly cherished command system requires courage. For the last twenty five years, by design or default, Ethiopia has been on slippery slope, governmentally, though it has been participating in a very successful market economy. To support more strongly the path to democracy, however, the ruling party, EPRDF, has the duty to encourage local residents to choose their representatives. To foster dynamism within the Ethiopian political climate, the ruling party must encourage and allow other parties to compete equally on a level playing field. If the EPRDF doesn’t stimulate other parties to reorganize and compete against it, it is very likely that the EPRDF Party will lose its early dynamism and it then resort to authoritarianism its stay in power.

Conclusion
Given the current political unrest that has mushroomed within the Oromo regional division, it would have been possible to resolveit peacefully before it arose, if the Ethiopian governors were willing to accept and respect the democratic rights of their citizens. It is because the Oromo people were excluded and the system failed to listen to them that the whole situation turned ugly. The result was, it didn’t only frustrate the Oromos, but triggered a number of Oromo university students to act violently. Before it got out of hand, and in accordance with autonomy and self-determination as stated in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution (such as, autonomy over culture, religion, education, language, land, physical structures etc), the local people of the two regions should have entered into a fruitful dialogue.

It is possible that the expansion plan of Addis Ababa might have been intended for a good cause. But, as it stands now, the Plan infringes on the self-determination clause and violates the rights of the Oromo People. Since democracy is based on compromise, if the Addis Ababa Regional Unit wants to expand, for whatever purpose, the Oromo people and the residents of Addis Ababa need to sit down with one another and negotiate, and openly reexamine the direct and spillover effects of Addis Ababa’s expansion plan. Now, the government’s decision to scrap the Addis Ababa Master Plan is welcomed because as stated by the European Parliament (January 19, 2016) it
…calls for an immediate inclusion and transparent political dialogue, including the government, opposition parties, civil representatives and the local population preventing any further violence or radicalization of the population; takes the view that such dialogue, conducting to the democratization of the country, is not possible under the current political conditions.”

Finally, Article 39 of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution was politically motivated and not meant to be practiced. It has created anxiety and disillusionment in the Ethiopian people. Now it is worthy that the Ethiopian Parliament, democratically nominated and elected by the people, deliberate on the relevance of Article 39 in the Ethiopian society. Personally, I am of the opinion that if Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution, as in China, is being deleted from the Ethiopian Constitution, it will give respite to the Ethiopian people from the intolerable headache they endured for the last twenty five years. Instead of cogitating over this incurable disorder, borrowed from elsewhere, it is better for the open-minded nature of the Ethiopian people to become visionary and seriously dwell on pursuing fulfillment of democracy in Ethiopia. Of course, Ethiopia can’t achieve full-fledged democracy without undergoing challenging hardships. Since the existing political structure of Ethiopia is impossible, the existing federated system needs to be further divided into manageable autonomous democratic units.

In short, the goals of a democratic and self-ruling federalism created by the Ethiopian people needs to guarantee self-determination, provide for power-sharing, and contribute to government stability. It needs to be transparent and include a reciprocal relationship between central and local governments, and between local governments and citizens.Through the transfer of authority, responsibility, and accountability from the central to local governments, democratic political decentralization incorporates both devolution and power to develop, implementing policy, and fostering the extension of the democratic processes to lower levels of government (Barnett, C. et al 1997, and Araia, 2013).

References:
1. Africa Development Fund, (March 2009). Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Country Governance Profile. Governance, Economic & Financial Reforms Department (OSGE), Country Regional Department East (OREB).
2. Araia, G. (2013). Ethiopia: Democracy, Devolution of Power, &The Developmental State.” New York: Institute of Development & Education for Africa.
3. Araia, G. (January 18, 2016). Ethiopia Should Manage Internal Political Crisis and Deflect Threats. Ethiopian Observer.
4. Assefa Fiseha (2007): Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia. A Comparative Study. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
5. Barnett, C. Henry P. Minis, and VanSant J (December 1997). Democratic Decentralization.Research Triangle Institute.
6. Borago,T.(2016). “Ethiopia: the only way forward is compromise and consensus.” http://www.ethiomedia. Com/1010ideas/4799.html.Retrieved January 3, 2016.
7. Davison,W. (December 14,2015). “Ethiopia Sees Fatal Ethnic Clash in Oromia, Group Says” Bloomberg Business.
8. Desta, A (2015). “Economic Growth and Governance in Ethiopia: An Observation” Ethiopian Observer.
9. Dixon, N. (Nov. 1994). “Marx, Engels and Lenin on the national question” International Journal of Socialist Renewal. http:links.org.au/node/164. Retrieved , January 4, 2016.
10. Ethiopia: Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994.
11. European Parliament (January 19, 2016). Motion for resolution, 2014-2019, B8-0121/2016.
12. Fleiner, T. (November 2006). “Challenges of Devolution and Power Sharing Structures in Federations.” Paper for the Conference of SAIS and SOAS, London, November 17-19th, 2006.
13. Kreptul, A. (2003). “The Constitutional Rights of Secession in Political Theory and History”. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 17(4), 39-100.
14. Lijphart, A (1968). The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California.
15. Lijphart, Arend (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative explanation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
16. Merera, Gudina (2003): Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for
Democracy, 1960-2000. Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing Press.
17. Muindi, M. (2016). “Why Ethiopia is making a historic “master plan” U-turn.” BBC Monitoring.
18. Turton, D. (2005, 92-93).Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in a Comparative Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
19. UNESCAP (2010). http:www.nuescap.org/pdd/prs/projectActivities/Ongoing/gg/goerance.asp. Bankkok, Thailand.
20. UNDP (2002).Human Development Report 2002:DeepeningDemocracyin a Fragmented World. New York: Oxford University Press.
21. World Bank Group (2001). “ Decentralization & Subnational Regional Economics”.

In todays’ Ethiopia the word Abay has become a source of worry for a few and brings despair and anger to the many. We have two Abays that are in the news and they are both causing us internal and external problems. Abay the river አ ባ ይ ወ ን ዝ is as victim as the rest of Ethiopia. Poor Abay nurthurer of Egypt and the great pramids, the longest river in the world and a name that evokes greatness and pride among Ethiopians is reduced to becoming a prop for Woyane ponzi scheme.

The Dam that will never be built has emboldened Egypt, created a military alliance between Egypt and Sudan and made Ethiopia look weak by submitting to Egyptian demands of how we use our own resource.No long term damage would come of of the current digging orgy carried by Woyane. It is fair to say the mighty Abay would not negativly be affected by the little ditch Woyane is playing with. The human Abay is what is doing the real damage to our country and people.

I am reffering to his Excelncy Ato Abay Tsehaye currently Policy Study and Research Advisor Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Office of the Prime Minister in other words the real power behind the throne. This is the Abay that has been creating havoc in our country for the last forty years. He fought the Derg but for all the wrong reasons and he has been proving that since TPLF took power.

Abay Tsehaye is the founding member of TPLF and is a long time Head of the Political Committee of the infamous organization. It did not take long for Meles to usurp power make a puppet out of Seyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye. They acted as loyal solders to make Meleses dream come true no matter how vile. It must have been the many years of built up resentment that made Abay take side with the losing Seye group during the internal upheaval of the mafia organization. It did not take long for Abay to switch. True to form Abay was one of the first to knell down and ask for forgiveness and swear allegiance to Il Duce. Meles must have been delighted to have his toy back on a shorter leash. Abay has been a model servant ever since.

He was assigned the Federal Affairs Job including the police, Addis Abeba plus baby-sitting all Kilil leaders. Abay was also what was known as the Sugar Minister. It is empowered with such authority that Abay fired all three hundred workers of Wonji Sugar without notice. He is that crazy and void of empathy. Abay is also the mastermind behind the insane idea of farming on Holy Waldeba Monastery Land. Waldeba is one of the holiest places in our country and instead of preserving and protecting our national treasure this TPLF Cadre decided to hire an Italian outfit to bulldoze Waldeba and grow sugar.

His Federal Affairs Ministerial rank is what gave Abay the real power today. During Meles time he was doing what the boss wished and his really dark side was under control. Today Abay is freelancing. He considers himself as the last guard to carry the torch of destroying Ethiopia from within. I believe one can say he was among equals in the TPLF Politburo until about a month ago. I am not sure about that today.

Meles and Abay raised all Kilil heads some from infancy. Kuma, Aba Dulla, Teferra and Addisu occupy a special place in their heart. They are family. Kuma and Aba Dulla both were peasant solders in the Derg Army and were taken prisoner by the Eritreans who handed them over to TPLF. At that time TPLF was becoming a force and has already mastered running prisons by condemning its own members. The TPLF designed a way to use the prisoners as messengers of TPLF ideology of ethnicity and obedience to a greater force. They were programmed to obey. Abay was assigned their boss and he made sure they stayed on message. Abay is elusive like a shadow doing everything from the background and is considered not merciful and is equipped with a sharp tongue like Il Duce.

Since the death of Meles Abay has been flaunting his new power. Of course he has the backing of Sebhat Nega another dinosaur brimming with hate and fear. The Oromo uprising is costing Abay dearly. He is being shown to be an emperor with no clothes. Losing OPDO that is the biggest and juiciest prize in TPLF basket is causing him lose legitimacy. Are the rumblings from the Amharas Kilil harbinger of things to come is what his friends are thinking? Does the Taxi drivers’ victory in Hosaena another crack in the system? How much should the rest of the Politburo stick with him and what becomes of stripped down Abay? Can he be used as an escape goat? They must have said to him ‘well Abay, the ball is on your court.’

Abay did not wait to find out further cracks in his fake armor. He went on the offensive. The media he chose to redeem himself is itself a riddle inside a mystery. He gave his interview to Horn Affairs a Party (TPLF) sanctioned outfit with a presence on Facebook and nothing of redeeming value other than making random childlike noise. He could have gone to ETV or EBC but he wanted to give this new upstart a leg up and strip it of any legitimacy to the ethics of journalism and conducting interviews.

Daniel Berhane the TPLF Blogger was given the honor of channeling Abay. He was being interviewed to set the record straight and restore his name and honor. What was he denying is a good question? Right around Christmas the Oromo Media Network (OMN) received a secretly recorded media of a meeting Abay Tsehaye attended with the group he is shepherding. The audio recording is clear and Abay Tsehaye’s voice, manner of speech and choice of words is hard to miss. He said some harsh words to the assembled ‘officials’ at that meeting. He threatened them and drew a line in the sand. It is not a pretty picture.

OMN shared this wonderful expose with the Ethiopian public. The issue he was stressing on was the famous ‘Master Plan’ to take land from the tillers. The Oromo people had already expressed their misgivings about the plan. The local people were becoming hip to TPLF’s plan of displacing them and making them part of the urban poor. The hidden ‘voice recording’ showed the people their government is a sham and OPDO was nothing but a foot solder to TPLF thugs. It is nothing new but hearing it like that makes one cringe with shame and boil with anger. To listen to the six million ordering and humiliating the thirty four million is always a little discomforting. The heroic stand by our young Oromo activists is what is why we are speaking of #OromoProtest and Abay’s role in this criminal act.

The interview with Abay by Blogger Daniel serves two purposes. He is deflecting attention from the TPLF while warning all collaborators the kind of defense his group will use if necessary. The video interview is a gem. We see this old and senile cadre squirming to make himself look reasonable and honest. He whispers and does not dare look straight into the camera or the interviewer because he knows his face betrays his heart. He sits side ways to hide his discomfort and the soft lighting makes him look weak shallow.

Needless to say he denied everything that was heard on the recording but he used the same words and sentence structure to deny it. That is how stupid Abay is. He asked where is the video? Really Abay, what do you think the idea of recording you in secret is about? I doubt you would rant like that on TV. Instead of saying that is not my voice, I did not say that Abay decided to argue about the location where it was recorded. Lord have mercy upon us for we are being tested.

The second message was to HMD and the remaining puppets regarding their role in this criminal enterprise. Here in America it would be appropriate to say ‘Abay threw OPDO under the bus.’ It is said when one sacrifices others to escape punishment or blame. Abay threw Kuma, Keder, Aba Dula and others under a moving bus regarding the Oromo land grab fiasco. It also means the puppets are responsible for the hundreds of people killed and thousands in prison. It is their Kilil and their business and the Constitution supports him of that assertion. Never mind the idea originated from TPLF and OPDO just implemented the directive but you see TPLF did not leave any fingerprint behind.

Abay is the true incarnation of Meles. In this situation of great significance where citizens have been killed, young ones are being imprisoned and families are being put in a very stressful situation Abay is just thinking of himself and no one else. Not his comrades, not his people and certainly not his country. A statesman would have come out to calm the situation get everybody to settle down and start a period of healing and finding the cause. That is not the TPLF style. He was willing to set the Oromo people against OPDO his own creation until he could find another solution. It is the usual band-aid approach. The veil is coming down.

It is another wake up call to the other Kilil officials that survive by the good will of Woyane. The Amhara, Southern Nations, Afar, Ogaden, Gambela are being given a warning if they are paying attention. Abay, Sebhat, Debretsion, Getachew and others are not there to protect you or share the crime. You are grown up boys read the writing on the wall and save yourself is what Abay is telling you.

The rest of us we stay the course. Woyane is being bankrupted everyday and they would run out of money to sustain their criminal enterprise. They cannot print money since the inflation that exists now has already made life unbearable for our people. The Diaspora has to cooperate in denying foreign currency and sharpen the boycott to help our people have a fighting chance. Let us act as concerned as the European Union that is forcing the mafia regime to stop and think. Do not let them laugh at our lack of spine and empathy.

Ethiopia located in the horn of Africa is the country that has a long history. That is to say it is the country that has equal history with the creation of the world. However it is very difficult to measure the length of Ethiopian history in terms of time for this the two historical documents namely the scientific and study document are proof of this. It is one of the two countries who have kept their independence it is a country which argued before the league of nations and also it is a country which is a signatory to establishment of the present united nations. It was registered not in ethnic terms but with its ancient name called Ethiopia.

When the great powers of year of sitting at the conference at Berlin 1885 to divided Africa among themselves, Ethiopia was able to preserve her independence. Following the second world war when many African countries got their independence, it was the color of the flag of Ethiopia which is green yellow and red they was reflected in their national flags. The example of Ethiopia has not been lost up to today in the minds of the people of Africa, Caribbean and far eastern countries.

Ethnic politics is not a new phenomenon. It is ethnic politics which is the shelter of dictators. It also serves as a means to spread the poison of racism.

Adolf hetlor in order to satisfy his racism he had to try to present the people of Germany as something different. He was trying to tell the people of Germany as people who have originated from Arayan race. However we can only learn to understand that situation are wrong only after the distraction of mankind and when we think of the matter again.

The 1960 generation of Ethiopia as generated new ideas. This situation enabled the military which does not know about ideology to take hold of the ideology it found nearby. All those parties who had embraced this ideology and who were calling for radical change were using the philosophy of Marxism. EPRP, Meison, TPLF are examples of this. The way EPRP and Meison understood Ethiopia and the method they went to change was clss contradiction.on the other hand TPLF and the Oromo liberation front, by bringing the contradiction to the forefront indicate that the ensuring the right of nationalities is a solution to the problem. However the Oromo Liberation front explaining that the case of Eretria is that of classical colonialism, and stated that the case of Oromia is that of internal Abysssinian colonialism.

This idea is still reflected by the scholars who were born in the area. TPLF which so the issue of nationality in a similar manner, to the extent that it raise a lot about this issue, however it is not heard when it raises issue of ethnicity to the extent that the Oromo national liberation speaks of. This is because the issue is that of power. And therefore it is a method used by all to come to power. On the other hand the workers part of Ethiopia which was established by the army and therefore although it was leftist and abusolutely dictatorial, it did not advocate that mach about ethnic politics and specially in this respect the attention it gives to national development and identity, is something taken from the rightists. Today Ethiopia is a country where by many new phenomena different from what existed in 1975. Not only the political, social and economic situation of Ethiopia but also one generation has gone and a new generation has come. The population of Ethiopian has grown from 30 million to 90 million (growing three times more). The uniform governmental administration has been changed into an administration based on ethnicsim and language. The cities have extensively grown. When the rural population is compared with the urban population during this three decades is lower 90% from the globe to 85% when the leaving standard of the people is compared with the African people like Nigeria and Ghana who won their independence in the 1960s is very low. The people lead a hand to mouth existence. Following 1991, it is said that the right of nations nationalites is the center of the solution. Nevertheless what the past 25 years have shown to us that the scientific analysis ehich had existed 25 years have shown to us that the scientific analysis which had existed 25 years ago, has been ababdoned. This analysis used to show that ethnic politics and federalism is source of conflict. The ethnic oriented left politics has a high disregard to the unity of Ethiopia, history and culture and value identity. It marginalizes although who give due attention to such values. It therefore uses various methods to undermine and belittle such view points. During the period of EPDF/TPLF not only it is used has a method of advocacy of giving power to the people which was an internal contradiction during the Derg period, but has made that governmental ethnic politics to became the social, political and economic relation of each Ethiopian. Ethnic conflict going beyond land conflict has reached up to village cattle pasture. As a result of this all Ethiopians were in conflict with one another. When it is known that this system has security people who want to create conflict between and among the people and therefore this situation shows in what dangerous condition that Ethiopia find itself.

Doctor Wondosen Teshome who is a researcher in anthropology at the Vienna university, in a research magazine published in 2008 at an international magazine as published the ethnic politics of EPRF/TPLF. He argued that the ethnic federalism is a divide and rule policy formulated by TPLF. He argue that the reason why the system has been organized in such a manner is to ensure the power of TPLF. The analysis however shows that the country could be Divided. While it is known that it is to change governmental ethnic politics, based on correct geography location, the historical settlement of the people what EPRF/TPLF does however if that it has taken giving adjudication of the ethnic members who are in conflict. It broadcast this in it’s news broadcasting and therefore speaking only on the basis of calculation makes all the more sad the big objective of those who advance ethnic politics is not ethnicism. Until the people by Making all sacrifice to enable them to come to power, they make a crocodile tears when they come to power however, consolidating their power becomes their sole purpose.those who advocate ethnic politics,with the view to conquer power see the obstacle that can encounter them this obstacle for them is the spirit of Ethiopianism which was built throughout the many centuries and which is still in the heart of the people. This Ethiopianism is built on past identity history, culture and belief. Therefore using every pretext all those public conflicts which undermine the past identity and which during their period were called heroic but in the 20 first century those who have committed worst acts and therefore by creating histories which were nonexistent, it attempts to undermine the base of Ethiopianism for example during the period were the concept of nations and nationalities affairs and federal administration were not the concepts proclaimed therefore such speech insults ethiopianism and fact at the time when the concept of federalism was not known, Aba Jifar of Jimma was administrating his own territory and the same time as regards matter related with the central government,, Aba Jifar was working with the central government.

Now at the period in wich we are living because of such thinking many in their thousands have been murdered many other thousands have been displaced from their place of residence when going futher from this, for all those who have evidence a statute should be built. The principal objective of such promoter is we should be in power and do what we want to do. They are ready to collaborate with any anti- Ethiopian force who can stand with them to realize their evil scheme.whenever ethiopian unity and solidarity strengthen they get freighted. This is because their thinking does not have any place in the eyes of stronger ethiopianism. They also understand that ethiopianism will not help them to come power.Embarrassing the rural lands of oromia region in the new master plan of Addis in not a problem to me. In fact, it will be more beneficiary if the plan going beyond Oromia embraces other regions. It is nice if a city grows. When a city grows, it’s surrounding expands as well. This is it’s natural characteristics. However there is a problem. As observed in the rule of EPDRF, the urban expansion strategy implementation is that when land is in corporate in the town may farmers who are living nearby will be displaced without their consent. Even if sufficient compensation is paid to them, the farmers will raise objection. The other reason is that as we have seen above it is our politics of ethnicity. This land belongs to Oromia. The people were told that they should take care so that the land will not be taken from them by the Neftegnoch. Therefore when the Oromo natives say that the land of Oromia belongs to us and therefore we do not want to give the land to anybody it takes measure. Why it is necessary to take a force measure. Is it they EPRDF is reaping what it has sown? At any rate the situation should be stabilized, EPRDF should examine itself concerning the matter. A political administration based on certain ideology and a onetime movement based on nationalism are similar with…. Disease ….. adisease which last for some time. Unless it is treated it is dangerous. However if it is treated it cannot cause any harm during the raining of the Derg to tell to one Kebele gurad a bout the wrongs of socialism may lead to death. The Kebele guard was right about the fact that he committed a murder. However after years, after……… has disappeared and observed the situation he understands that he has committed a wrong therefore what the politics got has created is just this. Thos forces who use the name of various ethnic organizations, it is by using the gun they try to release their objective.

This means, in other terms that the coming political forum will be dealt with the power of gun. This means we are not fortunate to have a peaceful transition of power. The since of Ethiopians is one which has strong social political and cultural connection therefore it is advantages to take our spirit of ethiopianism which is lasting and a common heritage. In this respect adopting ethnic politics will not be of any use. If the issue is power it is important to hold discussion on the basis of the true spirt of ethiopanism taking an oath in the name of got the came from and painting with hatred of oil the youth and children and other members and therefore making them fight with one another although it may seam successful for the time being eventually it may become a wound of conscience I finished here. I wish my country becomes a country where by the air of peace prevails.

January 25-31, 2016 is a National Drug and Alcohol Facts Week (NDAFW) in the US. This is a health observance week designed to give an opportunity for teenagers to learn the facts about drugs, alcohol and addiction from experts. The event is facilitated through various means of educational activities suited to the occasion and target population. The program is sponsored by NIDA and NIAAA, under the umbrella of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Taking advantage of this important occasion, hereby are discussed some relevant issues related to illicit drugs in Ethiopia.

Illicit drugs are substances that are available through illegal means. In other words, these are drugs that are illegal to produce, sell/supply or use. This categorization is based on scientific, medical and socioeconomic justifications and has generally universal acceptability. Almost all known illicit drugs are mind-altering substances that do not have any currently accepted medical use. Following consumption, these drugs interact with brain pathways involved in reward and reinforcement responses, producing a sense of pleasure/euphoria, at least initially. Their continued use, in most cases, results in the development tolerance, dependence and addiction. Cessation of consumption after chronic consumption usually leads to multiple unpleasant withdrawal/abstinence syndromes, and this is one of the driving factors for the continued use of these drugs, irrespective of consequences. In addition to effects in the brain, each of the illicit drugs also causes a number of other harmful effects on other organs of the body (eg., heart, intestine, reproductive organs), sometimes with fatal consequences. Beyond inducing unwanted effects on individual users, illicit drugs also have considerable negative impacts on other individuals and the society at large. Research has shown that the types and quantities of illicit of drugs used by consumers and the effects they produce can vary from place to place and with time. For instance, the use of the drugs, cannabis/marijuana, heroin, cocaine and ecstasy in the US has been all time high during the past several years, resulting in greater adverse effects relative to previous years. Some authorities believe that this scenario has a share of contribution to the medical, economic and social ills that the country is currently experiencing. That said, what is the situation of illicit drugs in Ethiopia? More specifically, what are the drugs considered illicit, where are they produced, who consume them and is there trafficking issues?

As with many other things, information on illicit drug use and trafficking in Ethiopia is generally scanty and largely remains vague. The discussion here is based on the best available estimates and should be interpreted with this shortcoming in mind.

Reports from different sources indicate that drugs that are categorized illicit in most other countries are also found in Ethiopia and these include cannabis, khat, heroin and cocaine. However, while cannabis, heroin and cocaine are also considered illegal in Ethiopia, khat is not. Since there is strong evidence to classify khat as illicit, the lack of this consideration in Ethiopia is puzzling. Many believe that, coupled with the negligent attitude of the TPLF government regarding the well-being of the Ethiopian people, this decision is largely politically and economically motivated. Based on available scientific evidence and the overwhelming recognition of khat as an elicit substance by the global community, in this article, the use of khat in Ethiopia is, quite rightly, considered illegal.

Cannabis

In most urban centers of Ethiopia, cannabis is more commonly known as hashish, but this actually refers to marijuana. In some rural or traditional communities, it is also referred to as by the Amarigna/Geez name, etse-faris, a name which is sometimes confused with that of Datura stramonium (Jimson weed). Marijuana is a “preparation” made from the dried leaves, twigs and flower parts of the cannabis plant; it is consumed by inhalation as smoke. Similar to the classification in most other countries with functional regulatory systems in place, marijuana/hashish/cannabis is also considered illegal in Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Ethiopian federal drug law lists penalties for illegal production, use or sell/supply of cannabis. However, despite this law, the possession or use of cannabis in present-day Ethiopia seems to be prevalent and widely socially accepted.

The cannabis plant in Ethiopia is reported to grow in many places across a wide range of geography. More notably, it is cultivated in Alemaya, Shebendia, Shashemene and Debre Berehan areas. Among all the places, of special interest is the cultivation of cannabis in the Shashemene area which was offered by Emperor Haile Selassie in 1966 to Rasteferians of Jamaican origin. Since then, this area has been recognized for its ties to Rasteferianism and for the production and quality of its cannabis. In most of these places, however, cannabis is usually cultivated in inaccessible locations where enforcement of laws is difficult to achieve. Such places include those which had never traditionally cultivated the plant. There is also evidence that some cannabis is smuggled into Ethiopia from West Africa by traffickers.

Although most of the cannabis production in Ethiopia is meant for local use, some of it is trafficked to outside (mainly to UK) by air, the vast majority being sent via the Ethiopian postal service.

Different reports indicate that, cannabis, in the form of marijuana, is used by a wide range of the Ethiopian population for different purposes. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has reported a prevalence of 2.6% cannabis use for adult Ethiopians for the year 2008. Other studies also have documented that the recreational use of cannabis by the Ethiopian youth, including students, has dramatically increased in recent years, particularly in urban communities. For a small proportion of the rural population, cannabis is useful as a medicinal and recreational substance. Still for some others, it is a source of extra income because of the increased demands both in the cities and from traffickers operating in the rural areas. In view of the documented ritual use of cannabis by the Coptic Church of Alexandria, it is also believed that elements of this tradition still exist in the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.

What does cannabis do to the human brain and behavior? Pharmacologically, many authorities classify cannabis as a hallucinogenic substance with mixed effects. The major compound (active ingredient) that enables cannabis to produce effects in the brain is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabionol (THC). The immediate effects include euphoria, a sense of relaxation, mood changes, increased appetite, reduced thinking capacity, suspicion and paranoia, and impairment of motion coordination. With higher doses, cannabis may also cause hallucinations, delusions, agitation and feeling of panic, especially in venerable individuals. Regular use of cannabis for a prolonged period leads to a lack of motivation and poor performance in school as well as in work place. Individuals with problems of cannabis use usually look tired with no desire to work on a regular basis; they are also less concerned about their appearance or even life. In users with psychosis susceptibility, high doses of cannabis for a long duration may trigger psychotic episodes. Abstinence from cannabis can cause a range of symptoms including sleep disturbances, insomnia, irritability, restlessness, excessive sweating, nausea, diarrhea and lack of appetite, among several others. For most consumers, these unpleasant withdrawal experiences can be a cause for continued use of the substance, whatever the cost may be.

Khat

Khat is a popular stimulant plant widely grown and used in Ethiopia and neighboring countries. It is commonly known as chaat in Amarigna. It is grown, distributed and consumed in Ethiopia without regulatory oversight. The use of khat has deep-rooted cultural and social tradition in some Ethiopian communities, particularly among the Muslim population. Ethiopia, besides being a major khat producer, is believed to be the pioneer of its consumption. The plant is typically consumed by chewing the leaves and swallowing the juicy product. While the reasons for the use of khat can vary from individual to individual, the plant is generally recognized as a stimulant of the brain, with abuse potentials, and a number of other unwanted effects.

From published research results and general observations, it is clear that the use of khat in Ethiopia has become a growing problem in recent years, especially among the younger generation, including high school and college students. Three major factors are believed to contribute to this observation: (1) absence of regulation of the production, distribution and use of khat, despite its well-documented harmful effects; (2) lack of sufficient awareness of consumers about the harmful effects khat; and (3) push by the TPLF government and its beneficiary collaborators (more notably Dr. Ezekiel Gebissa of Kettering University, who wrote a promotional book on khat some years ago), for increased production and consumption of khat for economic and political self-interest.

Even more alarming is that, beyond the traditionally recognized places, the availability and use of khat have spread out of Ethiopia to other parts of the world due to the recent explosion of migration of young people from Ethiopia and neighboring countries and improved transport systems for khat smuggling. Accordingly, the drug is now more commonly used in North America, Europe and Australia, where it is largely considered illegal. Khat being among the top five exports of Ethiopia, the TPLF government has become a beneficiary of this illegal activity through population displacement. From most of the evidence reviewed thus far, it appears that the policy of the government and its collaborators is a major factor for the problem khat in Ethiopia and elsewhere around the world.

The differences in drugs laws implemented for khat regulation in Ethiopia and in most other parts of the world have created a situation that encourages the illegal trafficking of khat from Ethiopia to prohibited countries in Europe and North America. While engagement in such an illegal practice has become profitable for some, it has caused disastrous outcomes for many others, such as serving jail times, paying huge fins and facing deportations. Even worth, for some khat-related crimes, associations have been implicated with international terrorist organizations.

Khat’s brain stimulating effects come mainly from its constituent compound known as cathinone, which resembles amphetamine. Classified as Schedule I drug, cathinone is an illicit substance in the US, and other countries. Shortly after chewing, khat induces euphoria, wakefulness, mydriais and increased energy, primarily as a consequence its action in the brain. With continued use, it also causes reduced appetite, increased body temperature, constipation, paranoia, sleeplessness and aggressiveness. Prolonged consumption further leads to a range of symptoms that include depression, anxiety, irritability, anger, sleep disturbance, fatigue, suspiciousness, hallucinations, panic attacks, and suicidal thoughts. With cessation of consumption after chronic use, like most other psychotropic drugs, khat causes withdrawal effects which are at least associated with depression, sadness, lethargy, reduced social interactions and vivid unpleasant dreams. The appearance of these symptoms is a major factor for persistent consumption of khat by chronic consumers.

Of additional note is that the consumption of khat in Ethiopia is usually associated with the concomitant use of other mind-altering substances, such as alcohol and tobacco smoke. Several research studies have reported a link between the use of khat and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, and this is suggested to be more directly linked to the consumption of alcohol that usually follows khat sessions.

Heroin

Heroin is an opiate (a narcotic analgesic) derived from morphine, a drug obtained from the opium poppy plant. It is highly addictive and widely held as one of the most destructive illicit drugs in the world. Presently, the vast majority of the world’s heroin originates in the war-ravaged country, Afghanistan, corresponding to the cultivation and harvesting of opium poppies. Another big player in the global heroin market is Myanmar (formerly Burma) in Asia.

Ethiopia has increasingly become a transit hub for heroin originating in Southwest and Southeast Asia, and destined for Europe. This popularity of the country as a route for drug trafficking is due to its convenient location, suitable air service, limited law enforcement and likely conflict of interest.

In addition, limited poppy cultivation has been reported in the southwest part of Ethiopia for local consumption of poppy seeds. There are also reports that at least some of the poppy fields have recently been eradicated by police. Whether or not this approach has significant impact on the overall heroin problem in the country is unclear. Other news sources, such as The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, have also reported the use of opiates/heroin per se in Ethiopia, especially in the Addis Abeba. There is now a concern that opioid consumption in Ethiopia is likely to increase in the future partly because of the country’s location on major trafficking routes into Europe and the ineffectiveness of the local regulatory and control systems.

Cocaine

Cocaine is a stimulant derived from the leaves of the coca plant which is widely cultivated in South America. It is one of the most sought-after and fought-over drugs in the world. It was reported to have been used by an estimated 17 million people worldwide in 2009. For cocaine, Ethiopia is also considered a transit hub from West Africa destined for markets in Europe and southern Africa. AS yet, no reports are available suggesting the cultivation on coca (Erythroxylum coca) in Ethiopia.

Other related drugs

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has reported amphetamine use by adult Ethiopians in 2008 at a prevalence rate of 0.3%. It appears that this compound is manufactured elsewhere in Africa and smuggled into Ethiopia. Furthermore, methamphetamine made in West Africa (notably in Nigeria) usually finds their way to East Africa for marketing. Both of these synthetic drugs are powerful brain stimulants with potencies much greater than that of khat. The compounds are highly addictive and their chronic consumption is usually associated with considerable withdrawal syndromes.

Concluding Remarks

As in many other developing countries, the use of mind-altering substances in Ethiopia is becoming an increasing problem, particularly among the younger generation in urban environments. This includes the consumption of illicit drugs, such as cannabis, khat, heroin and cocaine, among others. The problem is compounded by the cultivation and trafficking of these substances into and out of Ethiopia and by the lack of effective regulatory mechanisms and support system from the TPLF government in power and other institutions. The Ethiopian people have no choice but to take more personal responsibilities to protection themselves from the harmful effects of illicit drugs and other similar substances. This can be achieved through education, respecting legitimate drug laws, cooperative efforts, and seeking help from reliable provider(s).

Worku Abebe, 2014. Khat chewing among high school and college students in Ethiopia: prevalence and associated factors of relevance for intervention measures. The Journal of Ethnobiology and Traditional Medicine. Photon 123, 906-916.

Maria Phelan, Marie Nougie & Jamie Bridge, 2013. IDPC Briefing Paper HIV prevention among people who use drugs in East Africa, IDPC-Briefing-Paper_HIV-prevention-among-PWUD-in-East-Africa.pdf

Seshata, 2013. Canabis in Ethiopia. http://sensiseeds.com/en/blog/cannabis-in-ethiopia/

Worku Abebe, 2013. Prevalence and consequences of substance use among high school and college students in ethiopia: a review of the literature. African Journal of Drug & Alcohol Studies, 12(2)

Ethiopia illicit drugs, 2015. http://www.indexmundi.com/ethiopia/illicit_d

The recent student uprising in Oromia has brought into sharp focus the unsustainability of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The student unrest was sparked by the government’s decision to expand the city of Addis Ababa into the surrounding areas, but the real cause of the unrest lies in ethnic politics that has created ethnic federalism. Over the last 25 years, the regime has practised ethnic politics, stifling democratic rights, infringing upon civil liberties, and virtually eliminating the political space for the opposition. The results are ominous. Ethnic politics, if the experience of other countries is any lesson, engenders instability, turmoil, civil wars, and genocide.

Defining Ethnic Politics

Before I discuss the adverse consequences of ethnic politics, I need to define the term politics, as I use it in this commentary. Scholars use different definitions of politics, depending on what they want to emphasize: governing, power relationship, or resource management. For the purposes of this article, I have chosen the definition of politics that focuses on resource allocation. Some scholars have defined politics as the art of managing conflicts and cooperation in the struggle for scarce resources to achieve a common goal. Ethnic politics can therefore be defined as the art of devising, promoting, and exploiting ethnic discord to appropriate scarce resources for a narrow end. Under the category of resources, I include political power, land, capital, and employment, specifically employment in government bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises. This definition of ethnic politics, I believe, offers useful insights into understanding the current situation in Ethiopia.

The universal problems facing all Ethiopians, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, or region, are abject poverty, wide spread illiteracy, and rampant diseases. Eradicating these scourges of underdevelopment is the common objective of all Ethiopians, but individuals, groups, and regions have competing demands on the use of Ethiopia’s limited resources. Economists point out that different polities have used varying combinations of government intervention in the economy and market forces as the mechanism for allocating resources to achieve a common objective.

Officially, the TPLF-EPRDF regime claims to have opted for a mixture of state ownership and the market as the mechanism that best fits Ethiopia’s situation. It even fancies itself as a developmental state, but in reality has relied heavily on ethnic politics as its major means of resource allocation, resulting in inequitable educational, healthcare, economic, and political outcomes among the different ethnic groups of Ethiopia.

Ethnicism as an Ideology

The ideology of ethnic politics is ethnicism, an ideology that some commentators call tribalism. Ethnicism, a distant cousin of racism, is a group-based ideology that divides people into two groups: the ethnic in-group and the ethnic out-group (s). Ethnicism is a political looking glass through which the world is seen, interpreted, and acted upon. Ethnicism, just like racism, assigns positive attributes to members of the ethnic in-group and negative attributes to members of the ethnic out-group(s). Since it fosters ethnic stereotype, prejudice, and hostility, it is incapable of uniting people across ethnicities for a common objective. Ethnicism perceives members of other ethnic groups as less deserving, less worthy, and even less human; as a result, it harbours a perverted view of morality, justice, and ethics. In its extreme form, it turns into ethnic fundamentalism, as I have argued elsewhere.

Because ethnicism denies, at least partially if not completely, the humanity of members of the ethnic other, it is an inherently violent ideology. It vindicates violent and discriminatory practices directed against members of the ethnic other, collectively or individually. It endorses the use of force by an ethnic political party to come to power and stay in power. It rationalizes collective punishment for past ethnic grievances, instead of seeking forgiveness, reconciliation, and harmony. While all dictators use force to stay in power, ethnicist dictators brutalize mostly members of the outside ethnic groups. It is for these reasons that scholars who have studied ethnic politics in Africa conclude that

In sum, the politicization of ethnicity in Africa is associated with ethnic conflict; ethnic violence in the form of human rights violations, repression, civil war, and even genocide; political instability; democratic erosion; and the establishment of non-democratic regimes p. 7

All ethnic-based political organizations in Ethiopia today, both within the EPRDF and the opposition parties, contrary to what they may claim, have adopted ethnicism as their ideology. To argue that one ethnic political party is better than another is to engage in a beauty contest among monkeys, as the Ethiopian saying goes.

The consequences of ethnic politics are so grievous that African countries discourage ethnic politics, and many ban ethnic parties. In Kenya, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and other countries, it is illegal to form ethnic or religious parties. In these countries, the emphasis is on national unity, not on ethnic loyalty; and the motto, country first, not ethnicity first. Nations are built not just by constructing schools, clinics, and roads, but also by nurturing shared values, symbols, and histories. To destroy national identity—the foundation for national unity—is to kill the soul of a nation, and a nation without a soul seizes to exist.

The Contradictions of Ethnic Politics

In the 1980s, the TPLF claimed that the “main contradiction in Ethiopia is ethnic contradiction”. To resolve this alleged contradiction, it adopted ethnicism as the ideology for organizing the Ethiopian people, ethnic federalism as the platform where ethnicism can be practised, and ethnic politics as the means for allocating resources. Since coming to power, the TPLF-EPRDF regime has thoroughly politicized ethnicity and ethnicized politics. Consequently, in Ethiopia today, to be born into an ethnic group by chance is to take a political stand by choice. Belonging to an ethnic group is becoming a card-carrying member of an ethnic political party. It is no wonder that many Ethiopians regrettably believe that one’s ethnicity determines one’s political views. (I am sure, as you read this article, some of you may wonder as to which ethnic group I belong). The ethnicization of politics and the politicization of ethnicity, however, will eventually undo the TPLF-EPRDF coalition.

In practising ethnic politics, the government has simultaneously provided the opposition parties with an ethnic microscope by which they can scrutinize its policies, programs, and decisions. If the TPLF uses ethnic politics as a means of appropriating resources, including staying in power, the opposition parties can use the same tactic to dislodge it from power. Therein lies the TPLF’s own seeds of destruction. As the biblical saying goes, “live by the sword, die by the sword.”

The political loyalty to one’s ethnicity that the TPLF-EPRDF coalition has been preaching vociferously over the last quarter of a century will ultimately corrode the coalition. In the past, Meles Zenawi, because of his personality and his claim to legitimacy as a former guerilla fighter, was able to keep the fractious ethnic political groups united, but in the absence of such a personality and given the gross inequity in political power between the subservient majority ethnic political parties and the dominant minority ethnic party, it is doubtful if the EPRDF will remain united for long, especially if the unrest continues.

The Threat to National Unity

At the same time, ethnic nationalism, propagated both by the government and the opposition ethnic parties, has badgered, battered, and wounded national unity in Ethiopia so much so that the EPLF, the pioneer of ethnic politics, appears poised to reap the seeds of instability it had sown fifty years ago. After 25 years of being attacked relentlessly, national unity in Ethiopia has been effectively undermined, if not completely destroyed. The EPLF is lurking behind its surrogate ethnic political parties, principally the TPDM, to take advantage of the current situation to destabilize, fragment, and annihilate Ethiopia. We should never loose sight of that danger.

Further, the major opposition parties are mostly ethnic parties that espouse their own versions of ethnic politics, but to paraphrase a former US president, ethnic politics is not the answer; it is the problem. The solution to Ethiopia’s political problems must reject interference from the EPLF, must repudiate ethnic politics, and must use non-violent means. Or else, Ethiopia shall be no more.

Worku Aberra (PhD) is a professor of economics at Dawson College, Montreal, Canada.

Introduction

Admittedly, in all countries of the world, Ethiopia included, the reasons behind rising property prices could be many. In the Ethiopian case, these factors include, among others, demand for and supply of real (estate) assets, rising population and urbanization, the existence of a large number of tenants working for donor communities (NGOs) and multinational institutions, huge influx of money that the diaspora community sends back home (remittances) that largely is poured onto the housing and real estate markets. This commentary, however, focuses on government policy-driven (infrastructure and service sector-focused) and the corruption fueled aspect of the fast-rising real estate and related property prices.

A Short Context

For generations, land has been a pivotal resource and power in Ethiopia and this power is exclusively in the hands of the government and cadre elites who can expropriate land at will. It has been a highly lucrative sector for both the central government, party-affiliated parastatals, top-party elites and individuals and businesses with deep political connections. The lucrative business does not only emanate from a mere possession of land and real estate but also from the shoddy deals and access to lucrative bank loans.

Corruption as a Major Cause for the Roaring Real Estate Prices

The ruling party effectively owns all of the country’s land, coupled with the “ownership” of the commanding heights of the countries productive resources by the numerous party-owned conglomerates subsumed under EFFORT. Currently, a significant portion of popular anger coming out of the private investors happens to be directed towards the state owned military industrial complex (Metals & Engineering Corp. -MetEC) as a result of its deep entrenchment with corruption. Thanks to the monopolistic ownership of both the rural and urban land by the state, the rising real estate market and property prices have been vital sources for both the central government and corrupt cadre elites. The monopolistic ownership of land by local officials is also manifested by self-dealing (the sellers and appraisers being one and the same) which in turn has led to skyrocketing real estate and rental prices, making Addis Ababa one of the most expensive cities in the world to buy property. From time to time, the same local officials are observed in raiding and bulldozing of entire villages (in and around the capital and elsewhere), uprooting thousands of residents at time. A greater proportion of the evictions are in the form of forced methods, even though a limited of them seem to be “induced” ones. Local corrupt cadres and officials then sell the confiscated real estate properties piece-by-piece at inflated prices to both local brokers and real estate developers (“housing cooperatives”), thereby making unbelievably high level profits. As captors of the lands, city administrators and members of parliament at times toss around land proclamations until they get their royalties and rents from land grabbers. Using their power to access cheap bank loans, the highly connected real estate developers and brokers convert the same illegally demolished neighborhoods to hotels, condominiums, shopping centers, etc. Local officials, many of them municipal appointees get their cut both in kind and monetary rewards.

In its chapter dealing with the land sector corruption, the World Bank (Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia…) tells us that the corruption conundrum is manifested in the form of “officials and intermediaries collect[ing] multiple transaction and service fees” (page 303), through the use of “…weak policy and legal framework and poor systems to implement existing policies and laws… fraudulent actions to allocate land to themselves in both urban and rural areas and to housing associations and developers in urban areas” (page 305), by fraudulently forging land documents and illegally selling record rights (page 303), creating opportunities for officials for profiteering (page 307), etc.

What I am describing here are the same folks that the late Prime Minister Zenawi, in his February and March 2012 parliamentary addresses called “elephant owners of corruption,” “thieves within the government” and “robbers within the people,” analogous to eating one’s body like a wounded hyena. These are the same cadres and real estate owners that, again, the late Zenawi, in one of his public addresses which included many private business owners, chastised as corrupt. Raising his voice in a threatening manner, he told his audience that he happened to know that many of them own several real estate properties, registered under their names, their spouses, their small children and even under their dogs’ names. These are the same folks, in mid-2011, that Mr. Zenawi accused stashing $2 billion in overseas banks and/or real estate assets. These are the same cadres that government communication spokesman Getachew Reda, now tells us are involved in ‘massive corruption,” albeit stating the obvious in his attempt to mollify the discontented and implicate the wavering and betraying cadres and perhaps preparing the ground to purge them out of party leadership.

The land and real estate property capture has a vicious circle: Administrators conspire which part of city land to be taken away and which village to be demolished; brokers connect party hacks and local administrators with real estate developers (so-called housing cooperatives) and members of the diaspora; political party-owned firms and party loyalists, in collaboration with banks (whose large portion of business activity is in the real-estate sector), allow their folks to borrow funds at negative real interest rates. Each one of these interconnected groups get their cuts, while those evicted, after crying foul for a while, just “disappear!”

The Diaspora and Remittances Exacerbate the Corruption Conundrum

One can list a number factors, both positive and negative (theoretical and practical) regarding the role of remittances (i.e. funds sent by the diaspora community back home). Here, we focus only on the issue at hand- illustrating some of the observed factors for the rapidly rising property values in Addis Ababa and, to some extent, other regional cities.

Mystified observers repeatedly ask me why property values in Ethiopia not only are already so high but absurdly skyrocket on a continuous basis. Their next question is: “Isn’t this phenomenon a bubble and when do you think it will burst?” Then, they wonder why the Ethiopian Diaspora is so oblivious to corruption and why the same folks are largely in real estate investment (and not in establishing sustainable factories, extraction of mineral deposits, provision of electricity and telephone services, etc.). They are mystified because, under normal circumstances, real estate investors are supposed to weigh in the returns and risks associated with land-related investments (evaluate the fair-cash-on-cash flow of their investments). That is, the returns of the cash-flow rights to the acquired real estate (expected rate of return) should be one of the major considerations. Secondly, in addition to seriously weighing in the riskiness of an illiquid asset (i.e., real-estate), one has to be concerned with getting involved with the ongoing corruption conundrum. Such a calculation should reveal to them the future flows that the buildings and land are expected to generate, enabling them to compare the returns and risks of their real estate related investments to alternative ones- i.e., liquid financial assets such as stocks, bonds, and CDs which are available to them in the countries they migrated into. Thirdly, in an attempt to minimize the cost associated with attending the acquired properties, proximity to the property must be factored in. Under normal conditions, real estate prices and investments are also driven by the cost of credit.

As it turns out, what is transpiring in Ethiopia happens to be anything but normal or rational. For one, a good portion of the money “invested,” particularly the portion spent on residential structures is ill-gotten, thereby making real estate the home of laundered cash and as a means to cleanse money collected illegitimately. Secondly, the door for other avenues of investment requiring private entrepreneurial endeavors are closed by the Developmental State economic mantra and practice. This fact makes investing in real estate the only option available to citizens. Consider also the real estate “investment” made by a good portion of the diaspora: As indicated above, one of the factors that the “investor” should seriously consider is minimizing the amount of time and money that he/she would spend for attending the property. Our anecdotal but repeated observations of diaspora “investor” behavior (which includes several close friends and relatives) indicate that such thoughts never occur to them. They never consider the thousands of dollars they repeatedly spend every time they travel to the country to attend “their” property, pay taxes and submit their fingerprints. If this is not enough, many of these same folks end up being defrauded by the government agencies (a cunning plan also applied in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Zimbabwe), by their investment advisors, real estate brokers and even the sellers. The scamming of home buyers by the real estate developers is indeed an astoundingly common practice in the country. Even though many of them regretted after the fact, my anecdotal findings and extensive review of the popular version of the literature indicate that a good deal of the diaspora’s engagement in residential real estate investment is largely for its sentimental values, not financial gains. Even though a select few have found ways to enrich themselves, most happen to be building/acquiring residential (“retirement”) structures that they will never use (nor would it make any sense to do so).

Role of Negative Interest Rates and Rising Inflation Rates

Two other factors which have played a big role in driving up real estate and property values are negative real interest rates and rising inflation rates (both of the ruling party’s own making). In addition to discouraging saving, negative real interest rates encourage borrowing and, as a result, have been a means of transferring income from savers to borrowers. As it turns out, many of the borrowers happen to be political party-owned companies and those involved in real estate and related illiquid assets. Rising inflation rates also encourage speculation and the desires for holding commodities and precious metals. Since neither commodities and precious metals nor stocks are available in the Ethiopian case, speculation is largely on land and related assets. Real estate holdings also serve as hedges against rising inflation. For, inflation in general does not erode the (intrinsic) values of real assets such as real estate and precious metals. In general, the prices of precious metals and resale values as well as the rental rates of properties rise in tandem under such circumstances. At a time of rising inflation, land, bricks and mortar are considered safe investments.

Cornered Market

Monopoly position of land ownership by the government has enabled government officials and party-affiliated individuals to effectively corner the real estate market. The cornering emanates not only from the monopolistic access and ownership of land, but also from low interest loans and the funneling of diaspora funds to a certain investment groups who happen to be loyal to the ruling party. As it turns out, such a cornering activity also involves transnational diasporic finance. It is an open secret that, when it comes to the Ethiopian situation, nearly all major remittance intermediary business agencies are either directly or indirectly owned by the ruling party, elite cadres and persons with close ties with the government, which funnel the diaspora funds to kin and party affiliated investments back home. As practiced, the local authorities evict citizens out their lands, forcing them to leave their country of birth to seek for employment abroad. This act is a concerted policy of the government to sell people to enhance remittance flows. Their collaborators residing outside of the country funnel remittances towards certain preferred routs which are owned by individuals and firms highly connected to the ruling party. As Professor Minga Negash and myself have illustrated elsewhere, a large portion of the human traffickers happen to be individuals who have close ties with the ruling party. The process is effectively a vicious circle: The government policies directly or indirectly force citizens to leave their country in drones; human traffickers, a good portion of them licensed and very close to the ruling party, facilitate the migration process; business intermediaries facilitate and direct remittances to favored coffers- all designed to remain in power and make money. This disdainful and mafia type of practice has been revealed by the practices of Ethiopian authorities and consulate representatives during 165,000 plus Ethiopian migrants from Saudi Arabia and the aftermath of slaughtered Ethiopian Christians by Libyan religious fanatics. When outraged Ethiopians turned the government sanctioned demonstrations for protest against the killings of Ethiopian Christians in Libya, the ruling party used force against the outraged demonstrators, the beatings resulting in several injuries). It is interesting to note that the failure of the ruling party to demand the Saudi authorities to be accountable for their mistreatment and slaughtering of Ethiopian migrants even seem to confounded its loyal supporters and apologists.

Conclusion

Economic activity under the current Ethiopian government has largely focused on infrastructure building and the service sector (which include real estate development). Building infrastructure is indeed vital, especially for a developing country like Ethiopia. Unfortunately, undue emphasis on the aforementioned sectors not only will be unable to lead to prosperity, this writer believes that the policy has led to macroeconomic imbalances and is the cause for the ongoing skyrocketing real estate and property prices. The rise in property values and rental rates have resulted in the pricing and driving out of a huge majority of residents of Addis Ababa and other major regional cities. No doubt these have resulted in the transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich, thereby increasing the income gaps and public discontents. It is imperative, therefore, for the ruling party to address these serious issues. This writer believes the solution lies in designing land and urban policies, which should include changing the constitution that dramatically affects the ownership of land.

In the last article I posted, titled “Unity Overrides Everything,” I urged the Amhara to join the ongoing Oromo protests even if their reluctance is understandable in the face of the protests being confined to ethnic issues. Some of my readers did not like my appeal, arguing that the protests did not assume a national content and were anything but inclusive. In the many emails I received, the absence of references to Ethiopia and Ethiopian people was cited as the main reason that prevented and still prevents the Amhara from closing ranks with the Oromo.
Such an objection is for me quite disturbing. The most important complaint of the Oromo is that the Ethiopian discourse has always marginalized their contribution and identity in favor of a unilateral assimilation that favored Amhara and Tigreans. The demand that Oromo protesters turn their issues into a national or Ethiopian cause seems to repeat the past practice. Following the inescapable reality of the political fragmentation of the country, the Oromo rose up for their own cause, sacrificed their life, and now they are told that they should transfer their heroic deeds to the larger Ethiopian entity even though that entity remained aloof! I want to remind that most of the young Oromo protesters have no idea of Ethiopia as a unitary nation: as the established political system forces them to do, they see Ethiopia as a collection of different nations. Just as Kenyans are not expected to fight for Ethiopians, so too it is not surprising if the Oromo present their demands in terms of Oromo concerns.

The request to append the label “Ethiopia” to the protests is an invitation to commit historical robbery; more importantly, it forgets that Oromo courageous fight against the TPLF machine is how they rehabilitate themselves and become makers of their own history and, through them, of the history of Ethiopia. Clearly, such a request lacks fairness, to say the least. Who would blame the Amhara if they turn their protest against the ceding of tracts of land in Gondar to Sudan into an Amhara issue? Instead, what they should worry about in case protests break out is whether the Oromo will show the same solidarity as the Amhara have displayed to the Oromo. As the Amharic saying goes, the game is “ነግ በኔ”.
Those who expect the Oromo to rebel by assuming the Ethiopian identity forget that the notion of Ethiopia as a unitary nation has receded since the TPLF and the EPLF defeated the Derg and the former implemented the system of ethnic federalism. The fight for a unitary nation should have been waged while the TPLF was battling the Derg. It is now too late and there is no going back. Going back would mean war and, if the Ethiopian state survives, the cost would be the institution of another dictatorial system. How else, if not by blood and fire, would you impose unity after two decades of unrestricted ethnicization?

My unhappy readers seem to be sulking like a child moping in a corner after his wish has been denied. You do not present conditions when people rise and fight an oppressor that also happens to be your own oppressor. You join the fight and only then can you make the issue of unity a common cause. Those who simply watch cannot present conditions to people being beaten, killed, and imprisoned. To make your support conditional is to forget that you are also chained, beaten, killed, and imprisoned by the same oppressor. I find it strange, I repeat, that the sharing of the same fate with the Oromo does not trigger the sense of solidarity.

Nor do I understand how those who rightly claim to be the creators of modern Ethiopia, namely, Amhara elites––of course, in partnership with the Oromo, as evinced by the prominent role of Ras Gobena and other Oromo leaders, to remind those who would be tempted to forget it––do not come to the forefront of the fight for Ethiopia instead of making their intervention conditional on the acceptance of their demands. To pose conditions eliminates the unconditional commitment to Ethiopia, which is precisely what they accuse the Oromo of lacking. If you want an unconditional commitment to Ethiopia, then begin by showing your own unrestricted dedication by joining the Oromo despite the missing Ethiopianism, for only thus you can win them over.

To present condition is also to endorse the divided-and-rule police of the TPLF. Indeed, in being bystanders in this trying and crucial moment for the Oromo, what message are we sending to them? Are we not telling them that their cause and their atrocious mistreatment are not of our concern? How would they feel Ethiopian when those who claim to be Ethiopian turn their back on them? This is to say that the Oromo uprising gives us the unique opportunity both to defeat the TPLF and forge a new unity by our struggle against the common oppressor. Let us remake Ethiopia, this time through the concrete solidarity and unity of the oppressed!

The elephant in the room

Since the recent Oromo protests in Ethiopia, a number of commentators have written on the need for unity, compromise, and reconciliation if a democratic Ethiopia is to emerge from the present turmoil. Indeed, for more than twenty years, many have criticized the misdeeds of the TPLF and the dangers of the ethnic political system it has imposed on Ethiopians. But there is an elephant in the room in all these discussions and criticisms. It is the issue of ethnic self-determination. We seem to shun it as if the TPLF interpretation of ethnic self-determination is the only possible one.

On the resolution of this issue hinges the possibility or impossibility of Ethiopian unity and democracy. Unless we articulate an interpretation of ethnic self-determination that meets the democratic aspirations of Ethiopians who consider the question of ethnicity too important to be swept under the political rug, exhortations to unity and criticisms of the regime will not bring us closer to unity or to democracy. True, criticisms and exhortations are necessary. However, they do not add up to an offer of an alternative.

The right step in the wrong direction

In the context of Ethiopian history, the TPLF took the right step in putting the issue of ethnic self-determination on the political agenda. The problem is that it took the right step but channeled it in the wrong direction by reducing ethnic self-determination to ethnic essentialism. TPLF policies are guided by the belief that “ethnicity is destiny”. Hence, the bolting of every ethnicity into a specified territory—the kilil—and the obligation to identify one’s ethnicity on identity cards. As the absence of trans-ethnic solidarity in the face of the TPLF’s onslaught on certain ethnic groups shows, ethnic essentialism desensitizes Ethiopians to each other by making them mere samples of their respective ethnies, locked in their ethnicity, and unable to co-operate with each other.

The distressing consequence of the failure to develop an alternative understanding of the principle of ethnic self-determination is thus the fragmentation of the popular struggle against the TPLF, as we have seen in the recent Oromo protests. Many have asked: why have other ethnicities failed to join hands with the Oromo protestors? Such an act of solidarity would have given the protest a national momentum that could have advanced the prospects of democracy. Some have explained this absence of solidarity by the lack of unity. But this begs the question.

The real question is: what prevented the others, especially the Amharas and the Tigreans, from joining the protests? The answer is: the total absence of a unifying goal. Deprived of a unifying alternative interpretation of ethnic self-determination, each group sees the protest of the other through the ethnic ideology of the TPLF. Each says: it is their protest, not ours.

There is no ready-made answer to the question of ethnic self-determination. Developing an alternative interpretation of ethnic self-determination is a difficult but necessary task. We need it to build an Ethiopia wherein being proud of one’s ethnicity will be an expression of one’s proudness of being Ethiopian.

The basic question

I would like to draw the attention of those who believe in unity and democracy to a basic question: Is it possible to develop an interpretation of ethnic self-determination and Ethiopian unity in a way that makes each the democratic moment of the other? This basic question may be unpacked into two substantive questions.

• How do we persuade Ethiopians who believe in the principle of ethnic self-determination that there are ways of implementing this principle and ensuring at the same time the eradication of political, economic and cultural exclusions without resorting to ethnic essentialism?

• What kind of political institutions and territorial organization do we need to implement the principle of ethnic self-determination in a way that makes all of us voluntarily accept our identity as Ethiopians while at the same time being proud and confident enough of our ethnicity such that we do not succumb to the desire to essentialize and territorialize it as a way of self-protection?

Only when we have concrete proposals to meet the concerns expressed in these questions could we have a goal to which all Ethiopians could rally. Only then will we stop saying: it is their protest, not ours.

Against the two fetishes

To answer the above questions requires an articulation of ethnic self-determination and Ethiopian unity in ways that do not fetishize either ethnicity or Ethiopia. Currently, political fetishism is in the saddle and rides Ethiopian politics. For some of us, the fetish is “our” ethnie; for others, the fetish is “our” Ethiopia. We know from philosophy and psychoanalysis that the fetish is the enemy of change.

If we authentically want to see democratic change that will make ethnic self-determination and Ethiopian unity expressions of freedom and not closed and fixed identities, we need to go beyond these two fetishes. These two fetishes freeze our history and prevent us to see the forward-looking emancipatory alternatives that gestate in it.

Only by abandoning these two fetishes could we develop an interpretation that embraces ethnic self-determination as a democratic moment of Ethiopian unity and Ethiopian unity as a democratic expression of ethnic self-determination. Without a democratization of both ethnic self-determination and Ethiopian unity, neither unity, a precondition for democracy, nor democracy have a future in Ethiopia. Ethiopia will be trapped in a permanent state of intermittent local, isolated and disconnected protests and conflicts, as we have seen over the last twenty years. Such a condition serves the interests of the TPLF but not the democratic interests of Ethiopians, whatever their ethnicity may be.

The Lesson

For those who want unity and democracy, the lesson of the Oromo protests is clear.
As long as we do not develop an alternative that recognizes the principle of ethnic self-determination and that implements it in ways that make ethnic identity a legitimate expression of Ethiopian identity without essentializing and territorializing ethnicity, unity and democracy will remain pipedreams.

As a consequence, we will continue nursing our favorite fetishes—“our” ethnie or “our” Ethiopia. And the TPLF interpretation of ethnic self-determination will continue its hold on those Ethiopians who reject, rightly so, the old idea of unity, however it may be dressed up in the rhetoric of democracy and solidarity.

Moreover, if we do not develop an alternative understanding of ethnic self-determination and Ethiopian unity which makes each the democratic expression of the other by the time the EPRDF implodes, which seems to be likely, we will not have democracy. Rather, we will have another dictatorship, ethnic or otherwise. .

Yekatit 12 commemorated by Ethiopians and friends around the world every year in many ways. To remind folks of all ages about our past Ethiopian history, a book review could be one of the venue to commemorate by highlighting the event.

The book was written by Dr. Harald Nystrom in Swedish. It is titled “With St George on the death ride” and have 238 pages of memoir and diary of Swedish doctor about the Italian and Ethiopian war of 1935 to 1936. It was translated in English by Dr. Thomas P. Coleman in April 2012. Then Dr. Gebeyehu Teferi and Desalegn Alemu translated the book to Amharic and published it on June 2014.

Dr. Harald Nystrom is a Swedish national and born in 1898 in small hut in Eritrea. His parents were living as missionary in Eritrea. At age 21 he went back to Sweden and Beirut for higher education. He returned in 1928 to Ethiopia as medical Doctor to work with Emperor Haile Selassie’s Body guard army unit.

The Amharic translators supplemented the book with coined title to reinforce the central idea of the book by naming it “The Hidden memoir”. The book content remained unchanged. It is an eyewitness account of a Swedish doctor “embedded” with resistance guerrilla patriots in the Northern front of Ethiopia during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

The first few pages of the book portray his life in the Ethiopia. Dr. Nystrom involvement began when Emperor Haile Selassie’s Government foreign Minster Beltane Geta Heruie approached and requested him to fly to north of Ethiopia called ”Dabat” in Beghemder area to treat one of the sick Patriotic man by the name of Dejazmach Ayalew Birru. Although the Doctor expressed his fears going to war zone because of the inherent danger that war poses, he finally agreed and proposed a financial compensation for his work and insurance for his family. The Haile Selassie government agreed to pay him the compensation.

Dr. Harald Nystrom journey started on a small plane from Addis Ababa. He headed to “Debat” ዳባት with his some medical supplies. As he flew over the mountains, gorges, and rivers he expressed his admiration of the beauty of the natural terrain of Ethiopia. Everything went well on the flight, except he had scary landing experience at his destination. There is no proper landing strip. He said that “the pilot turned the plane six full circles to avoid the hills and to find good area to land. After few scary leaps the pilot managed to stop the plane before it crushed.”

He was greeted by Dejazmach Ayalew Birru’s men. Dr. Nystrom appears to be the first white person ever been in this area. One can only imagine how he felt to be a complete stranger. Just by being a white man there was a chance he could be mistakenly killed by Ayalew’s men or by other warriors as enemy. He was prepared to cope with any difficult situations. What help him most to assimilate with local people was his familiarity to the culture and most importantly speaking Amharic language fluently.

After he rested well at this first stop, he continued his journey on foot with Ayalew’s loyalist to Ayalew’s camp called “Tegeta” ጠገዴ. As he continued his treacherous trip on foot with small group of Ayalew’s followers, he climbed on chain of Simien Mountains, saw a hauntingly beautiful forest, and looked out enjoyable scene of the flat land of the region. During this journey, he friended with the group and learned the cultural history of the region. Finally he arrived at Ayalew’s camp. He met Ayalew and his commanders. Ayalew got the badly needed medical care and his condition gets better very quickly.

Ayalew was a fifty years old man. He fought side by side with Menelek II’s in many occasions and proved to be the best warrior. At very young age Emperor Menelek II promoted him to Dejazmach title and was served as the governor of Keffa -.

During the Author’s stay at the Aeylaw’s camp he described what he observed about the Habesha’s behaviors, the primitive war camp life, and the warriors readiness for battle. He described the situations in great details in particular the size of resistance force, the type of foods they eat, the diseases, the challenge of treating the wounded patriots, the lack of medical supplies, suspicion among the war front leaders, the social composition, how they carried out their fight to the unmatched highly skilled enemy forces, and the banditries problems they encountered from time to time. He also wrote about other front leaders such as Ras Imru and Ras Mulugata. Despite the odds against them, their stiff resistance at the war front slowed down the advancement of fascist Italian army. He reflected an interesting fact about the diversity of Ras Mulugata patriotic army. His army unit includes the Kemabtta warriors from South of Ethiopia. It is a validation of Ethiopia freedom fighters has been multiethnic all along. The multiethnic freedom fighters unity, endurance and sacrifice is duly recognized as one of the great landmark in Ethiopia history. Hence, Ethiopia has existed as an independent country for a very long time.

The Author focused about the relatively little known of Dejazmach Ayalew Birru’s stories. In spite of Ayalew heroism, the Emperor had suspicion of Ayalew’s loyalty. The book described how the Emperor always was checking the loyalty of him in indirect ways. As result, his hometown people sang for him” አያሌው ሞኙ ሰዉ አማኙ.

Undoubtedly, Ayelew had the best warriors under him who contributed the most for his success in the battle field. It is interesting to briefly indicate an impressive story telling on couple of battles in particular at “Dembeguna Pass” and “AF Gaga pass” battles (on page 87 & 109). Despite the Italians military supremacy in airplanes, tanks and poison gas usage on the battle, two of his commander of Ayalew Birru’s guards by the name Balambaras Tessema and Fitaurari Shifferaw were the war heroes at “Dembeguna” battlefield. (I.e. Balambaras means “Commander of the fortress, and Fitaurai means “Commander of the vanguard”) This account of the story testify to the fact that real patriots are honest to their words and rarely lie. On page 55, prior this battle, while he was staying at the war camp the Author mentioned about Tessma breaking a basic camp rule that prohibited making fire for cooking. The rule was set for security reason. The smoke could be seen by the foe, may expose them for attack. Balmabaras Tessema was sentenced forty lashes for breaking this rule. The book described this terrified moments vividly, hearing the lashing and seeing the physical pain. It is clear that after just one round of lashes could suffer instantly bruised skin. But Balambaras Tessema was not showing any of his pain. Surprisingly after 40 lashes, he got up and bowed to the leaders and walk away without grudge.

Later on “Dembeguna battle” he performed incredibly fight with the enemy. On this battle the Italians were using, tanks, Libyan horsemen, askaries (Italian and Eritrean native soldiers) and air attack. Shifferaw and Tessema men were fiercely fighting. The patriots were fighting with outdated rifles, sward, and spears and hand to hand fighting. The patriot’s morale was high. The Italians could not use the air power due to hand in hand fighting. In middle of fierce fighting, Tessema run to one of the tank, and climbed on top the tank and started hammering the tank’s door shouting “open” the door, the Italian tank gunner appears to be confused and opened the door. Balambarase Tessema quickly shoot in the open door, the gunner tried to do some maneuvers but stuck between trees and suddenly the tank caught fire. The Italian army were running in total disarray from the battlefield. An Italian Major wounded and carried out with stretcher, several army officials and support drivers were killed instantly at the spot. Some escaped, some attempted to surrender by hands up, but the Patriots were not aware of this surrender sign they kept attacking at them. Shifferaw was killed on this battle. Tessema is the first Ethiopian patriot successfully disarm the enemy tank. It feels good to note that these commanders charged across open ground in the face of relentless gunfire and sacrifice their lives to defend Ethiopia from aggressor.

The story takes a turn by the defeat of Ethiopian patriots at Shire/“Selaclaca” area war front. The Patriots lost the battle and Ayalew retreated to his home town. The enemy advanced deep in Ethiopia territory and occupied for five years and the rest is history.
At the end of the book the Author conveyed short summary as why the Ethiopia patriots were defeated. Here are some reasons he documented: the lack of leadership skills, poorly armed with nearly obsolete rifles, most men had swords, spears or clubs, many never heard sound of airplane motors, no knowledge they were facing battling with mechanized army, inadequate food or shelter, poorly dressed, a rampant disease, many days spent marching arduous trails, uneducated and had no fighting drill, undisciplined i.e. filled with emotion at the battlefield (firing to early), deep religion believe as title of the book indicate that St. George supposed to be a savoir in the battlefield, etc. The Author admired the Ethiopians patriots about their pride, dignity, the will to fight, love of their motherland and commitment to defend foreign aggression. They strived under impossible condition during the battle.

On November 1, 2015, Posted in Al Mariam’s Commentaries entitled “Reflections on Prof. Mesfin’s “Adafne”: Saving Ethiopians From Themselves? Recognized the patriots sacrifice in the same vein:

Prof. Mesfin writes,

“Up to the present, the written history of true Ethiopian heroes is negligible. Little has been written of the patriotism and heroism of Dejazmach Geresu Duki, General Jagama Kelo, Shaleqa Beqele Weya.[ I would emphatically add to the list the name of Dejazmach Kebede Bizunesh, a great Ethiopian patriot who not only whipped the Italians in battle time and again in the late 1930s a few miles west of Addis Ababa but also fought in his old age the Derg with valor and against all odds for nearly three years. So many unsung and forgotten heroes unknown to Ethiopians and known only to God. I am so proud and deeply grateful to all of them!].”

The Patriots paid a heavy price. Dr. Nystrom stayed seven months with the resistance Patriots in the battle field in care of the sick and treating the wounded. Despite the hardship he faced, he showed deepest unselfish efforts to help the freedom fighters, and was true sympathetic adviser to the patriots. He deserved a great credit for his strong support to stick with patriots. We thanked Dr. Gebeyehu Teferi and Desalegn Alemu for super work, effort and heart they put in translating in Amharic. Special thanks goes to Dr. Nystrom of his unique diaries survived to tell this untold stories of the devastating battle of 1935-36 in northern Ethiopia.
(Picture of Dejazmach Ayalew with private guards)

In the previous installment, I discussed the inherent dangers of ethnic politics. In this section, I will outline the arguments that the defenders of the killils make, and hint at reforming ethnic federalism.

The TPLF and the other ethnic nationalists hail the creation of ethnic federalism as the greatest achievement of the struggle against the Derg. I respectfully disagree. It was actually the worst blunder the TPLF-EPRDF regime made in 1994. Ethnic federalism, its architects argue, designed to address the ethnic injustices of the past, would bring about ethnic equality, unity, and harmony; as well as social peace, but it has not delivered the Promised Land. On the contrary, it has worsened inter-ethnic group relationships. The on-going armed conflict between the Annuaks and the Nuers in Gambella and between the Konso and the Burji in the south, the uprising in Oromia, and the turmoil throughout Ethiopia indicate that it has been an abject failure.

But, what is ethnic federalism? The definition of the term “federalism” has evolved over time, and currently there is no universally accepted definition. A scholar who has studied federalism defines it as “a system of government based on the sharing of powers by two levels of governments with equal status”. (p.19). Theoretically then, under ethnic federalism, the federal government and the local ethnic governments share powers. For example, the federal government is responsible for defense, internal peace and security, and foreign affairs, and the local ethnic governments are responsible for the provision of essential services such as education and healthcare. There are other details, but this in brief is the broad outline of ethnic federalism.

As I have argued in the previous section, ethnic politics created ethnic federalism; ethnic federalism was launched to serve the political interests of the OLF, the EPLF, and the TPLF. The demands of ethnic nationalists for ethnic homelands, the EPLF’s strategic objective for a destabilized Ethiopia, and the TPLF’s aspiration to stay in power through divide and conquer produced ethnic federalism.

Ethiopia’s federal state is federalism in appearance only, draped in ethnic costumes but buttressed by brutal force. The ethnic states, other than language rights, have limited powers. As a result, Ethiopia has become a United Nation of ethnic states, which manifest varying degrees of commitment to national unity, overseen by a dictator. When the dictator goes, they too may go their separate ways, as happened in the former Yugoslavia, unless Ethiopia establishes a geographically-based federal state that fully expresses the democratic wishes of all ethnic groups.

The difference between a geographically-based federalism and an ethnic-based federalism is functionality. The first acts as a means of sharing powers, the latter serves as the agency for dividing Ethiopians, readying the ethnic states for possible separation, and keeping the regime in power indefinitely.

Defending the Killils

Proponents of the killils have not persuasively argued why ethnic-based federalism is better than geographically-based federalism. Instead, many use fallacious arguments to defend it. Some argue that those who oppose ethnic federalism, especially the Amhara elite, favour a unitary state, hopelessly wishing for the return of Amhara rule. This is a red herring. It is not just Amharas who oppose ethnic federalism. Many Ethiopians, including prominent Oromo intellectuals, oppose it. By invoking the real or imagined “Amhara injustices” of the past, killil supporters strive to stifle the discussion on the issue. But the defence of the killils should be based on facts and logic, not on intimidation, emotional blackmail, or ad hominem attacks that generate much heat but produce little insight.

The argument that says that the choice facing Ethiopia is between ethnic federalism and a unitary state is a false dichotomy; it assumes that a unitary state is the only alternative to ethnic federalism, yet there are other forms of federalism that confer real powers to ethnic groups.

Unless we accept ethnic federalism, some killil defenders suggest that the dissatisfied ethnic groups will separate, as Eritrea did. There are a few problems with this argument. First, separation is not the only alternative to ethnic federalism, as stated earlier. Second, we must remember that for a dedicated separatist, ethnic federalism is not the end game; it is only the first crucial step towards nationhood. We can never please separatists.

The threat to secede assumes that secession will benefit the ethnic group that secedes and hurts the ethnic groups that remain united. This is an erroneous assumption. Separation does not necessarily bring about freedom, democracy, and prosperity to the new ethnic country, as the distressing experience of Eritrea shows. Separation harms all Ethiopians. Unity benefits all Ethiopians, economically and politically.
Economically, a larger country provides economic diversity, promotes economic efficiency, and enables the realization of economies of scale. Politically, it encompasses a larger political space and hence a potentially higher level of tolerance for different political views to flourish. It also creates a potentially wider coalition in the struggle for justice, equality, and democracy. It is much easier for a dictator to prevail in a small country. National unity, therefore, should not be the nervous preoccupation of only one ethnic group, but rather the conscientious concern of all ethnic groups.

Looking Forward

I accept the basic tenets of a federal state, but I reject ethnic-based federalism because of its negative social, economic, and political consequences. As in all federal states throughout the world, Ethiopia should adopt a geographically-based federalism. But after 25 years of ethnic federalism, after so much emotional investment in the killils, it may be politically impossible to dismantle ethnic federalism, without much bloodshed, but it can be reformed, along regional lines with geographic designations.
For example, the existing awarajas or zones can be consolidated into regions to form larger states that recognize the rights of both the dominant and minority ethnic groups. The division of powers between the federal and local governments should be clearly delineated and legally sanctioned. Federal institutions must serve the national interests of all Ethiopians. The constitution must be thoroughly revised to reflect the democratic wishes of the Ethiopian people. Article 39 should be struck out. And so on.

Solidarity with the Oromo People

I have argued that ethnic federalism is inimical to national unity, but opposing ethnic federalism is not opposing the struggle of the Oromo people or other ethnic groups to pursue their democratic aspirations. I support the struggle of the Oromo people against injustice, inequality, and repression, within a united Ethiopia. I condemn the killings of the demonstrators by security forces in Oromia.

Further, since the Oromos are a plurality in Ethiopia, I believe that Ethiopia should seriously consider making Afar Oromo an official language, along with Amharic. Ethiopia can become, like Canada, an officially bilingual country, with Amharic and Afan Oromo as the official languages of the federal government so that the Oromo people can have equal access to employment opportunities in the federal bureaucracy and so that the Oromo people will be served in Afan Oromo when receiving services from the federal government. Oromos must feel at home in their own country. I am not suggesting that all Ethiopians be forced to learn Afan Oromo, only that federal government officials and employees be fluent in one of the official languages and be functionally literate in the other language, as is the case in Canada.

Ethiopia, a multi-ethnic and geographically diverse country, must adopt a geographically-based federalism where the dominant ethnic group in each state exercises autonomy, while respecting the rights of minority groups, within a democratic and united Ethiopia.
Worku Aberra (PhD) is a professor of economics at Dawson College, Montreal, Canada.

This first discovered fossils in sub-Sahara, known as chororapithecus afarensis, would give an insight into the scientific debate on the evolution of human beings.

The Authority for Research and Conservation of Cultural Heritages announced recently that Ethiopian and Japaneses researches have discovered fossils of ape and other mammals ancestors aged eight million years in Mi’esso District, West Hararge Zone of Oromia State.

According to Authority press release, this first discovered fossils in sub-Sahara, known as chororapithecus afarensis, would give an insight into the scientific debate on the evolution of human beings.

The discovery has proved the hypothesis the existence of ape ancestors in Africa for the first time between seven and ten million years back. Previously, various researchers believe that human like ancestors come to Africa from other continents as such discoveries representing the aforementioned period were not made.

The apes and various mammal ancestors discovered in Ethiopia proved that such ancestors were in Africa some eight million years back. This chororapithecus afarensis discovery could as well give further insight into the period in which the evolution of human beings and apes took their own course.

The research was conducted and led by the Ethiopian and Japanese paleoanthropologists namely Dr. Yonas Beyene, Dr. Berhane Asfaw, Prof. Kato Shigehiro and Prof. Gen Suwa with the coordinating role of the Authority.

If we make the Ethiopian Student movement as a starting point, the cry for democracy in Ethiopia is fifty years old and counting. Since then, in pursuit of democracy, the Ethiopian students and the organizations that the movement birthed have made tremendous sacrifices. In the process, Ethiopia lost her best and brightest. Countless were persecuted, tens of thousands jailed, still thousands others fled. Ethiopian also saw three governments during this period. Despite all the sacrifices and changes in government, democracy is still yet to come. As the result, Ethiopians are frustrated to the point of losing hope.

In this write-up, I argue that the reason for the unsuccessful attempt to create a democratic Ethiopia was that we worked on a top-down approach to replace the government from the top with the hope to “trickle down” democracy to the people when the better approach would have been a bottom-up, that is, spread the principles of democracy among the people to empower them to shape their own destiny.

Let’s start with definition. The formal definition of Democracy is that it is a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections (Merriam-Webster).

The first version of democracy as defined above was first exercised in Athens, Greece two thousand- five hundred years ago. Considering our first ancestors, the Homo sapiens, emerged about two hundred thousand years ago, two thousand and five hundred (when democracy appeared for the first time) is a very short duration. This means that it took humankind about one-hundred ninety-seven thousand and five hundred years of trial and error to forge the first democratic rule of governance. Yet, even today, two thousand and five hundred years after the democracy was practiced first, only a third of the world’s population are abiding by it. The rest of the world’s populations are still longing for it. Even in those societies where democracy is accepted as a form of governance, the people practicing it are still working to refine it and make it better. This is to say, even in democratic countries, democracy is still work in progress.

In its true meaning, Democracy is an agreement (covenant if you will) reached between people of a nation as to how they should conduct their affairs of governance, economy, education, health care and technological development. An agreement or contract between people (even when the involved individuals are only few in numbers) is an emergent property of the interaction of individual citizens of a given country. That why democracy got the phrase “by the people, for the people”

Democracy is a pattern that emerges (comes to exist) from people’s interaction with each other as they attempt to work and live in harmony with each other. Developing a pattern of harmonious living requires countless social experiments, trials, errors, success and failures. So before discussing democracy in detail let’s first look at how patterns emerge in general.

Simple rules and emergence of patterns

Society is dynamic networks of many interacting individuals. Each individual’s behavior is governed by a small set of simple guidelines. Despite the limited capability of an individual human being, the interaction of millions individuals can produce much larger complex emergent structures. Examples of complex structures that are built by actions of millions of individuals include, markets, cities, armies, nations and cultures including democracy etc. The individuals produce those larger entities though simple action which are guided by simple rules. At times, it is not even obvious for the individuals involved to comprehend the aggregate patterns that would result from their own actions.

What are simple rules and how do they contribute to emergence aggregate patterns such as democracy? Simple rules are a set of simple (basic) guides to actions performed in sequence to achieve a result. The basic actions that become simple rules initially emanate from individual’s (agent’s) effort to adapt and fit to their environment’s stimulus. These set of actions (rules) come to play as the result of conscious or unconscious agreement between the individuals involved when cooperation between them is necessary for their common good. When these actions are performed by many and become routine, then we call them simple rules. The repeated implementations of these simple rules by countless individuals over long time become patterns which latter become norms and cultures.

For example, through their life experiences (like realizing the ugliness of discrimination), if people of a one community agreed to abide by a simple rule which says “treat every human being as equal” and everybody practiced it all the time and to all the individuals in that community, a pattern that denies discrimination emerges. And if this pattern persists over long time, it becomes the culture of that community.

Note that small modifications on the agreed upon rules of interaction can lead to significant changes in the behavior of what is going to emerge. So the agreed upon simple rules should be consistently practiced until different agreement is made to modify or replace them with agreement by all those involved.

Examples of real patterns in our society

The Sunday and Friday prayers. The fact that Christians go to church every Sundays and Muslims go to Mosque every Friday to pray is a norm and is taken for granted in our times. But this was not the case all the time. Back in the days, when the religions started (2000 years ago for Christianity and 1400 years ago for Islam) the first leaders (innovators) as well as the followers of the religions had to figure out ways as to how to establish the new belief systems (the religions) and make them resilient against the constant attracts from the then strong belief system-paganism. Through many trials and errors, they came up the simple rule which the believers should practice. One of such rules (there are many rules of course) was to go to prayer places once a week to pray together. Repeated over thousand years, and by millions, the rule has created patterns which become the norm and culture we know today.

The Masinko rule. Those of us who like Ethiopian cultural music know this all well. When we are in a wedding or at a party where Masinko (or any musical instrument for that matter) is played, we all try to match our Eskista (dance) with the rhythm of the Masinko. As varied as our individual movements are, the overall movement of the crowed creates an “averaged” the pattern of movements appear uniform to an observer. The simple rule practiced here is “match your Eskista with the tone (rhythm) of the Masinko” One can cite many examples on the connection between simple rules and patterns. But I will stop here. The lesson to take from both examples is how powerful simple rules can be to create patterns.

Democracy as an emergence pattern

Now back to democracy. I said democracy is an emergent social pattern. As mentioned above, it took human kind close to two hundred thousand years of trial and error, which means that thousands of wars, millions of lives and destruction of countless property etc. had to happen for people to figure out and develop the set of the “required” simple rules that helped avoid war and destruction and the emergence of democracy for the first time. One can speculate the following to be the simple rules that would create the patterns of behavior that became democracy. (Note that these are my assumption, true and practical rules are developed through involvement of many and by trial and error).

· Respect and care for yourself and others,
· Tolerate differences,
· Treat everyone as equal
· Stand for your right
· Recognize your destiny is tied to that of others

Note that there is no one individual who designed the simple rules nor they come down from a super power. The members of the community came to them through trial and error. They are the results of people’s attempt to adapt and fit to their changing environment. The other key point to note is that, at least the majority, if not all, of the members of the society have to accept and operate by these rules for the pattern of democracy to emerge. Once this pattern takes root and become the norm of thinking and acting by the people, it then becomes engrained in the culture. Of course this does not happen overnight and a lot of back and forth, failure and success have to happen.

The practice of the simple rules has to be replicated at every level from an individual, to small groups, all the way to national level organizations in self-similar manner. Only then can they cause the emergence of democracy. The simple rules are literally simple and are not significant when practiced by the individual member alone, but when practiced by millions, their collective impact sets the pattern of democracy. So the emergence of democracy is inherently peoples’ business. Only the People make it happen! It does not come from the above particularly from a corrupt government!!

Asking for Democracy

In countries like Ethiopia, where democracy did not yet emerge, it is a common practice to demand (by the people and opposition organizations) the government to deliver democracy. I think there are a couple of issues we need to consider asking democracy from undemocratic government.
First, the groups that is holding power do not know the true meaning of democracy, let alone, to practice it. It is not engrained in their DNA of simple rules that the rulers operate by. The simple rules they follow and the resultant pattern that emerge from it is totally different from the simple rules for democracy. The simple rules the people in power follow is something like this: “Suppress the people by all means possible to guard the interest of the minority”

The implementation of the ruler’s simple rule produces the pattern of dominance, violence, injustice, unfairness and corruption. The pattern that emerges from the implementation of this simple rule is system of dictatorship. The pattern of injustice, unfairness and corruption is practiced at all levels starting from the strong man of the government, his cronies at highest level, to provincial, regional, and local government branches all the way to individual level. Dictatorship replicates itself from the smallest element, which is the individual, all the way to the center of the government in the same way following the same simple rules for dictatorship. So we are asking what the dictators do not have.

Second, expecting democracy from undemocratic forces is unrealistic because they do not have it to begin with. They operate with a different rule. In doing so the democratic mined people are wasting their meager energy and time when demanding democracy. This is to say that the Ethiopian people wasting their valuable time and resources expecting democracy from the Ethiopian government when we should be building democratic patterns one citizen at a time according to the simple rules for democracy. Democracy is people’s business and we should go to the people and start the foundation of democratic patterns from the bottom up.

The energy and time of democracy promoting agents would be better spent going to the citizens and advocating the practicing of the simple rules that brings democracy. Doing that paves the way for the emergence of a democratic pattern. Advocating for the equality and dignity of people, teaching that rights and responsibilities go hand in hand, that everyone’s voice is as equal as any others’ is tantamount to erecting foundations for the emergence of a society that is free of tyranny, corruption injustice right from the grass-root level.

But this is not to say that demanding democracy from the government in a peaceful manner is wrong. Even if the government does not have it, advocating for democracy will do at least two good things. First, by asking for democracy, it is possible to create awareness among the population. The second is that there may be a chance of converting some members of the government including the army to following the simple rules of democracy.

Democracy is a bottom- up process. This is to say that the emergence of democracy is the business of the grass-roots where individuals discover, practice, and negotiate simple rules and forge them into their everyday working tools. Then, the people would self-organize around these rules to create permanent patterns. Democracy emerges when individual citizens buy into the rules one person at a time and implement them to self-organize and create patterns.

To some democratic forces, the idea that building a democratic system from the bottom up, one person at a time, is too slow of a process and needs to shelved or disregarded. To them, the emergence of democracy in this way takes forever giving dictators opportunity to prolong their time. I say, consider the last forty years that my generation spent chasing political power from the top. What did we get? We got one dictator after another dictator. Had we known and accepted the democratic simple rules approach and worked from bottom up during the last forty years, our Ethiopia would be in a better place.

In fact, once the initial condition is set by the first grass-root group formed on the basis of the simple rules, the principle of self-similarity comes into play and more and more similar groups comes to exist and the democratization process among citizens gets momentum and becomes faster. This is because, people by nature are eager to learn from each other and apply what works to serve their interests. The fact that citizens are networked with each other, before we know it, the experience is replicated by countless individuals and other similar groups formed to become powerful force. For these reasons, working to bring democracy from the bottom up can become much faster than chasing democracy from top- that is from the governments who do not have it to begin with.

Another point that deserves mentioning about the bottom up democratic process is this. Dictators do not come from the sky. They come from among the population. If the population has enough democratically minded members (that is members who have adopted the simple democratic rules) the chance for dictators to be dominant or to have enough followers to pursue their undemocratic behaviors is much smaller or can even non-existent. So by pursuing democracy from the bottom through grass-root movement, to develop fair minded democratically thinking citizens, we can deprive the undemocratic forces the fertile ground they need to flourish.

Lastly but not least we are observing the power of bottom up movement from the current democratic movements of the Oromo people. I think the current grass-root based democratic movement of the Oromo students is a testimony to the power of the bottom-up approach to democracy. A lesson that all who are concerned should register and learn from!!

Introduction

In addition to the senseless killings of protesters by the ruling party against the Oromos, the latest video clips and news reports also indicate that the same protests in Oromia region have led to the burning/destruction of properties, foundations, etc. There is an ongoing and raging debate among Ethiopians, residing both in and outside of the country, in regards to this debacle. Some members of the diaspora link (and rightly so in this regard) the burnings/destructions to the innumerable atrocities and endemic corruption committed by the ruling party. Their condoning seem to emanate from the fact that a good portion of the destroyed properties are owned by corrupt elites and foreign companies (individuals). The owners of these properties and structures are reaping what they have sown, they argue. Folks who echo these sentiments seem to consider riots as antidotes to unending pillaging and a necessary evil. There are others, particularly those who consider themselves as soldiers of the peaceful struggle, which includes those who participated in and organizing of the protests, who argue against the burning and destruction of properties. The observed destructions and burnings, they say, were perpetrated by saboteurs of peaceful struggle and repercussions of the ruling party’s uncalled for brutalities on peaceful protestors. The burnings and destructions also seem to have put a large portion of Ethiopians in a quandary and deep dilemma. They are really seem to be between a rock and hard place (that is, unable to either condemn or condone the destructions).

As a soldier of non-violent resistance, I also do not condone the observed burnings/destructions. But contrary to our wishes, I acknowledge and fret the fact that burnings and destructions of greater magnitude may be inevitable. In fact, I saw this debacle coming, long ago. And I have raised this possibility, on several occasions, with friends, such as Professors Minga Negash, Messay Kebede and Berhanu Mengistu, every time we discussed the cunning nature of Ethiopian corruption. As we discussed the magnitude of Ethiopian corruption, it seemed as though our heads have become dizzy and our voices trebled, for the unfathomable destructions could reach epic proportions. Why do Ethiopians consider the government supported investment structures and properties as not belonging to them but instead as “foreign” assets and even vehicles of exploitation and oppression?

Now, if you want to understand why the protesters failed to understand that foreign direct investment (FDI) creates wealth (which it does), but they instead consider even the “domestically” (political-party and elite-owned) “investments” as alien/foreign owned, why foreign direct investment is considered as a “fancy word for stealing” and as highly exploitative and accessory to evil, etc. and why they even venture for their destructions, I urge you to read on. If you want to understand the nature of Ethiopian corruption, its ramifications- how it has been and continues to irreparably damage the social and institutional fabrics of the country, and most importantly, if you really want to be thinking of designing strategies for combating it and forestall potentially devastating destructions, please allow me to elaborate.
This commentary is designed to implore you (the reader) understand the intractable nature of Ethiopian corruption and then think about potential “solutions.” This is because designing strategies and finding “solutions” require a good grasp of the type of corruption found in a specific country- in this case, Ethiopia.

State Capture – a Form of Garand Corruption as the Root Cause of the Problem

As I have shown on several occasions before, what we have been witnessing in Ethiopia is the most pernicious and intractable form of corruption known as State Capture. This form of corruption needs to be distinguished from what is known in the corruption literature as Administrative (Bureaucratic) Corruption. It is the type of corruption defined and observed in the traditional manner, almost all countries, save post-communist (transition) countries. In particular, Administrative (Bureaucratic) Corruption deals with the extent in which the bribe payer uses the existing laws, rules, and regulations to tip the balance in his favor. In general, administrative (bureaucratic) corruption is known to take place at the implementation level of the bureaucracy while the political (grand) corruption of it takes place at the highest level of political authority. Examples of variants of administrative corruption may include: impeding the implementation of justice; getting involved in the forgery and/or destruction of documents; delaying and/or procrastinating on executing high level official (assigned) duties; using official hours for personal gains; misrepresenting one’s authority; getting involved in partisan favors (nepotism); misusing public property; engaging in absenteeism; getting involved in kickbacks from developmental programs; pay-offs for legislative support, diversion of public resources for private use; overlooking illegal activities; common theft/embezzlement; overpricing, establishing non-existing projects and tax collection and tax assessment frauds, etc.

Even though it may be difficult to completely eradicate it, fortunately, nations could minimize the damage done by Administrative (Bureaucratic) Corruption by ensuring transparency, accountability and openness in governmental activities. This is done, for example, by (a) Establishing power centers outside the bureaucracy; (b) Establishing independent electoral boards and developing and allowing competitive party politics; (c) Using the independent media, which in turn enables interest groups, members of civic society, NGOs, etc.; (d) Using the investigative powers of the parliament; (e) Setting up of independent anti-corruption boards and commissions; and (f) Using the independent judiciary system.

However, what we have been witnessing in Ethiopia is a different kind of corruption known as State Capture, which is known to have manifested itself in transition (formerly socialist) countries. It is a phenomenon in which powerful groups exert their corrupt and undue influence in order to shape the institutions and policies, laws and regulations of the state for their own benefit rather than for the public good. State capture could arise and be practiced in several ways: it could result from powerful individuals, groups or firms using both non-transparent provisions as well as legitimate and transparent channels to deny competing groups have access to state officials and resources. It could also arise from the exploitation of the “unclear boundaries between the political and business interests of state officials” by specific groups and state officials for their mutual benefits at the expense of the society in question (Hellman: 1998:3). According to Broadman and Recanatini (2001), state capture is harmful corruption that subverts the entire political process designed to ensure that policies and regulations favorable to specific groups and business interests are implemented.

State Capture may differ from country to country. In some countries, state capture could clearly be seen as a variant of a corruptive practice known as crony capitalism in which powerful groups, individuals and oligarchs shape and manipulate the formation of new policies- “rules of the game”- to their own advantages. The phenomenon could be observed whenever state officials pass decrees and/or legislative votes favoring the organized business groups, oligarchs or powerful individuals. It could also be observed by huge “concentration of economic and political power” and economic inequality arising from self-interested actors gaining and controlling over the state and its resources. The State Capture phenomenon could also be observed by the collusive activities of powerful leaders (regional or national), ministers, and legislative and judiciary executives, corporate executives of state institutions/agencies and party-owned companies. In some cases, state capture is a result of weakened legal and political institutions. In some other instances, captors purposely weaken the country’s legal and political institutions so that they would be susceptible to capture and exploitation. It is also manifested by the failure of economic reforms and the stripping of public assets by some powerful individuals or organized groups using the “privatization” process. In some instances, state capture could be observed when organized groups clandestinely create a state within a state (“parallel state”) in order to influence the state structures, including the judiciary, the security apparatus, the military, and even the media. In some countries where state capture has occurred, the line between what is private and what is public, what is official and non-official, what is state and what is market are totally blurred. As you can observe from the above descriptions, under state capture, a country’s laws, regulations, legalities, and ultimately its institutions are part of corrupt transactions. Such corruption features are quite different from the Administrative/Bureaucratic Corruption described above.

In some countries such as Ethiopia (Hassan, 2013) (and to a limited extent, countries such as Uganda and Rwanda), the entire political, economic, legal and military structures are under the control of powerful cliques or ethnically organized groups. Corruption of this type is pernicious because these same organized groups, in collaboration with owners of powerful firms and/or oligarchs, happen to dominate the vital sectors of all institutions (economic, social, legal and military). In some cases, as manifested in countries such as Russia in the 1990s and in some countries in Africa, Ethiopia included, the practice of capture is highly organized and predatory. The captors are known to use, among other things, violence and intimidation. They are known to have created their own monopolies (oligarchies) and cartels in order to monopolize the vital sectors of the economic system while at the same time disabling the ongoing market reforms. In short, this kind of corruption resembles a modern version of organized crime.

Country Specific Characteristics of Captors

The corruptive activities of the captors are largely similar but they may differ by country or origin and type of captors. In post-communist countries, Hellman et al (2000:3) make distinctions between private “captor firms (i.e. firms that make private payments to public officials to affect the rules of the game) and influential firms (i.e. firms that have influence on those rules without recourse to private payments to public officials).” The captors in general are the nomenklatura – a group of former managers and bureaucrats of state-owned enterprises under the old Soviet system and other Eastern Bloc (estimated to be about 1.5 percent of the population) who were “engaged in ceaseless political maneuvering among themselves while maintaining total power, as a privileged class, over all the others.” They could also be public officials who “may use their positions to capture enterprises,” or a group of actors such as the members of parliament, the executive, ministers and judiciary acting in unison (the ruling party leaders acting prosecutor, judge, and jury).While largely similar, state capture in developing countries such as Ethiopia, differ from those in post-communist countries in some important ways: For one, unlike their Russian and East European counter parts, the Ethiopian captors do not exclusively belong to the nomenklatura (higher officials of the communist parties), since a large portion of them were rag tag guerrilla fighters who had marched all the way out from the bushes to seize power and enrich themselves. Secondly, in countries such as Ethiopia, the state capture phenomenon is highly parochial (and quasi-feudal and ethnic-based) in nature. Unfortunately, patronage infested Ethiopian corruption has a strong tendency for both envy and tolerance – such a tolerance for vice emanating from those whose ethnic affiliation with the ruling clique. This tendency known to have permeated the Kenyan society (Michela Wrong, 2009: “It is Our Turn to Eat.”)

One also observes a very strong patron- clientelistic and neo-patrimonialistic nature of corruption in these countries (Ethiopia, in particular). Thirdly, unlike in some post-communist countries such as Eastern Europe, in which some oligarchs were forced out of political power, the Ethiopian captors continue to hold both political and economic power. The Russian oligarchs made their fortunes through wheeling and dealing and by committing all kinds of economic crimes including buying Russian assets at throw away prices (so did their Ethiopian counter-parts). Mr. Putin did not like the political meddling of some of them and hence used his scorched earth tactics to put some of them behind bars and sending some of the others into exile while at the same time stripping of their assets (while leaving alone those who did not venture to politically challenge him). The captors in Eastern and Central Europe gradually lost their political clout partly due to the desires and efforts of those countries to join the European Union and fulfill the EU’s conditions and the latter’s assistance in fighting and eradicating state capture. Fourthly, state capture in countries such as Ethiopia is unparalleled in that it is a stronger form than one finds elsewhere in that it encompasses the seizure of the political apparatus and the commanding heights of the national economy –the seizure extending to the military, security, foreign policy and judicial system and even the media. In Ethiopia, the predatory oligarchs’ appetite for controlling the commanding heights of the country’s economy, misappropriating its resources and accumulating wealth using a network of political power continues unabatedly, thereby exacerbating the gaps between the haves and the have-nots. The elite predation has led to a virtual criminalization of the state to the extent that mafia type of criminal activities pop up occasionally. Another peculiar characteristic of State Capture in Ethiopia is its high level ethnocentric nature. As a result, the lines between what is official and what is private are totally blurred, and the party and the state have become almost indistinguishable. It is for this reason that many are tempted to label the Ethiopian corruptive system as highly kleptocratic. As a result, they say, this captured economy is trapped in a vicious cycle in which any policy reforms designed to improve governance are doomed to fail due to the constant collusions between the powerful groups operating from outside and within the government.

What Has Transpired in Ethiopia?

What is being witnessed in Ethiopia is the establishment of shell companies in contravention of the country’s commercial codes, such as establishing “share companies with only 2-5 “shareholders”, most of these “shareholders” being party leaders. As Gennet Mersha explains, parallel existence of political party-owned businesses has led to “leakage of resources in the form of capital flight, the granting and manipulation of licenses, (c) use of inside information pertaining to privatization, competition for state contracts and bids and awards of project contracts such as road and building and other construction works, (d) lack of competition, and, (e) systematic discrimination of businesses and professionals.”

What we have observed is “favouritism and clique building [which] flourished around the privatization boards (Minga Negash). What the Ethiopian people witnessed were improper handling of the restructuring and privatization process (Mersha: 2010), Young (1998), Vestal (2009), and Negash (2010). What Ethiopians have witnessed is large-scale systemic state capture through the rise of suffocating political-party owned companies (“endowments”), such as EFFORT and the numerous companies subsumed under it. What we know is the refusal of the members of the ruling clique to return the country’s assets that they looted when they were guerrilla fighters. What we know is party hacks presiding “over top-level boards of party-owned businesses and major government enterprises including banks” and their funneling of easy bank loans to regional party-owned companies. What has transpired is the disfranchisement “other” Ethiopians and the stifling of completion through the awarding of contracts to those connected with the ruling party, such high level nepotism being very high in the construction sector (see, World Bank’s Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia, Chapter 6, for example.) What we have witnessed on the daily basis, twenty five years and counting, is the currying of favor to these same conglomerates and cadre-owned and favored companies resulting in the distortions of competition and lack of competitive marketplace. What we have witnessed, much like countries which were under the influence of the Soviet Union, is the seizure and control of the financial sector by a specific group. What we are witnessing is suffocation through the use of the so-called new press and anti-terrorism laws. What we observe in Ethiopia is, the passage and adoptions of new laws such as the one prohibiting of opposition parties from receiving funds from abroad, while at the same time the ruling party benefiting immensely from it. What has developed is a culture of zero-sum mentality, a powerful leadership with deaf ears that is “too rigid, arrogant and disconnected” with high level of patronage. What Ethiopians have witnessed is the constant attack and dismantling of opposition political parties, the weakening of the country’s institutions – be they the dismantlement of independent civic organizations, the watering down of the quality of education, constant violation of the rule of law, etc. What is being observed is the creation of toothless anti-corruption commission to hoodwink donors and the hijacking of anti-corruption efforts-to the extent of using it to attack and imprison political opponents. Just like in Russia and elsewhere, the ruling party of Ethiopia has captured the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and practically all regulatory agencies- all distinguishing caricatures of State Capture- the highest form of corruption that is “directed toward extracting rents.
These are just a few.

The Repercussions

State Capture and (mafia type) criminal oligarchy, accompanied with an unbelievable arrogance and repression has resulted in deep disillusionment, cynicism and polarization in the country. It has resulted in once upon a time rag-tag guerrilla fighters and poor taxi drivers, not known for their ingenuity or something else that is good, becoming extremely wealthy, almost overnight. It has led to the setting ablaze of property, in which local businesses happen to bear the brunt of the destructions. Riots do not take place in a vacuum. The causes are the nauseating greed on the part of the ruling party, the eviction of tens of thousands of people from their ancestral lands and the transfer of these same lands, with little or no compensations, to the ruling party owned companies, elites and foreigners. The causes of the riots are, no doubt, outright nepotism and organized crime committed by the ruling elites. Corruption riddled land transfers have resulted in a transfer of resources from the people into the hands of the very few. Those whose lands have forcedly been taken away and displaced and those who have been oppressed seem not to be taking the abuse any more. As an economist, I see the ruling clique’s overreach (of forced displacements, arrogance, insatiable greed and suffocating corruption) having lasting collateral damages. Thanks to the overreaches of the government and criminal activities of party elites, foreign direct investment is now considered a fancy word for deceit and exploitation. Indeed, people-centered and properly compensated urban development projects would have been win-wins for all those involved. Thanks to the land-related rampant corruption, the ruling clique’s dirty tricks have undermined future legitimate development projects. No doubt these overreaches will be big time setbacks to future development.

Allow me to elaborate the fraud infested and predatory land grabs which sparked several unrests, a little more. Just like North Korea and China, land belongs to the Ethiopian government, which in turn created a space for a frenzy of uncompensated land grabbing, rent-seeing and nepotism. Using several endless land proclamations as their tools, Ethiopian officials and land grabbers might have copied Chinese practices of forcefully expropriating land. It appears that land grabbers in Ethiopia have failed to understand the problems associated with such a practice. For one, forced evictions have resulted not only in human rights abuses and the violations of the international covenant forced evictions that China has ratified, but the scheme has contributed to a growing income inequality. Ethiopian authoritarian rulers should have known that growing inequalities have consequences. Secondly, a large portion of the eviction in China was largely done by local officials and against the wishes of the central government. In Ethiopia, both the re-zoning and demolition plans and executions are done by the directives and order of central government authorities, contributing to the rising resentments. Thirdly, both the central and local governments of China were able to create factory jobs which absorbed a significant portion of the evicted peasants, resulting in indirect compensations to the lost properties for those who have been displaced. In Ethiopia, local communities hardly get any benefits from the “investments” despite promises of creating jobs. Fourthly, contrary to what is largely observed in Ethiopia, it appears that Chinese local authorities and developers compensated evictees even though the compensations were nowhere equal to the market value of the properties. Fifthly, in the Ethiopian case, those who benefit from land –related corruption (which includes forced evictions and demolitions) happen to be the top echelons of the ruling party. Sixthly, unlike the Chinese case, the Ethiopian population is highly divided along ethnic lines, such divisions exacerbated by the policies of the regime itself. Last but not least, unlike the Ethiopian land grabbers, the Chinese authorities never use live ammunitions against protesters whose lands have been seized illegally. That must be why other ethnic groups, the Oromos, in particular, consider the so-called federal police (repeatedly observed brutally beating students) and the military only belonging to and used as a killing paramilitary squad of the TPLF. The Ethiopian people have repeatedly witnessed that the ruling party have never been accountable to the atrocities it committed. Witness the tortures, disappearances, mass arrests and massacres the regime committed in 1995, 2005/6, 2014, and now 2015/16, the genocide committed against the Anuak people in 2003, the killing of university students in 2001, just to name a few. The Ethiopian people have been traumatized by the endless atrocities. It is these and numerous other atrocities that have forced the Ethiopian people to think that this is not their government. It the lootings and the extreme corruptive activities which have led the Ethiopian people to think the properties and investment as not belonging to them but to a parasitic group who are not one of them. Consequently, it is not hard to imagine corruption that is committed by “others,” – and in a lot of cases, orchestrated by those who claim to be representing one ethnic group – to be viewed with great envy and anger thereby escalating the polarization. No wonder it results in extreme discontents and riots.

State Capture, together with oppression, arrogance and brutality is leading the country to experience an accelerating socio-politico-economic breakdown and to potentially ethnic/sectarian conflicts- all contributing to the unravelling and possible disintegration of the rotting system. Unfortunately, the collapsing system will have collateral and innocent victims.

“Solutions”: Where do we go from here?

As I indicated above, State Capture is anathema to reforms. In the Ethiopia of today, there is no independent judiciary that can uphold the rule of law since the rule of law gets subverted by top level officials on a constant basis. There are no checks and balances. All we have is a rubber-stamping “parliament. All we have is a toothless anti-corruption agency which is saddled by the lack of resources and incompetence. Nearly all independent and privately owned newspapers have been forcefully shuttered and many of the journalists sent to jail or exiled. These brutal measures have deprived the country (and the ruling clique itself) from using an independent media to expose the rampant corruption. Civil society organizations have been either decimated or captured. What we have is an executive body which fires auditor generals when they expose corruption. In today’s Ethiopia, every regulatory agency is captured, to the extent that Mr. Sibant Nega, the founder, architect and now revered figurehead of the TPLF, boldly and unashamedly admitting the obvious: that corruption in Ethiopia is so bad that it has permeated even the religious institutions. The Ethiopian oligarchy lacks a Vladimir Putin (that is, Meles Zenawi) who could have served as an anti-corruption czar and his unparalleled power and Machiavellian tactics to trap and quell his distractors and possibly extend the political life of the oligarchy. The paranoia riddled and heavy handed measures taken against the Oromos by the ruling clique clearly indicate not only the ruling party has become headless but it also indicates a lack of command and control.

What we are left with is three relatively powerful groups, who could potentially allay the pains inflicted upon the Ethiopian people by rampant corruption – their measure having the potential to extend the political life of the kleptocratic regime. Even though these groups may be able to extend the political life of the regime, they would not save it from eventual collapse since corruption of this magnitude cannot be saved from within. What I am thinking about are (a) Multinational institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank and others; (b) Donor nations, particularly the United State and the EU; and (c) Pressure from stakeholders who are a part of and closer to the regime, that is, ‘custodians of the status quo’ (Berhanu Mnegistu, 2016-“Mediating Political Space…”). The first two are holders of strong arms – capable of putting immense pressure on the clique. For one, these institutions and donors know how aid dependent the regime is- so aid dependent just “[like] a patient addicted to pain killers,” The United States and members of the EU, the U.K. in particular, along with the aid institutions, know the “aid” they provide is the source of corruption, be it via illicit financial outflows, used to recruit and pay millions of cadres, used to fund forced villagization or other means. As I have shown elsewhere, donor nations know that part of the seeds of capital for party-owned conglomerates are the “aid” they provided. Should the wish to do so, donor nations can bring the TPLF leaders to their knees by suing them for their misuse of foreign aid and money laundering. As to the third group, according to Professor Berhanu Mengistu (2016), the effectiveness of the ‘custodians of the status quo’ depends not only on their ability to “convince the narrow stakeholders” that change is in their best interests but also their ability to direct those changes. One may legitimately ask: Would the custodians of the status quo be able to control their own greed and selfishness when in fact the entire ruling party, top-to-bottom, being so repugnantly corrupt? Well, if they failed to do so, then they will lose all that they have amassed!

So, why did Oromo protesters burned down properties and investment structures located within their own neighborhoods? Well, it is because of the resentments which have been running deep against overbearing party elites who scoop up lands that don’t belong to them – the grabbed lands making them to become very wealthy almost overnight. All that the people see is wealth following senseless corruption, party affiliation, bloodlines, but not hard work or original access to one’s ancestral land. The protesters are not only pushed out of their ancestral land but they also do not have jobs, money or even prospects. As the rioters’ selective attack targets indicate, the burnings/destructions and boycotting seem to be directed at those owned by the TPLF and its supporters. Unfortunately, resentments of this kind are harbored by other ethnic groups. Such practices may indeed be repeated in other regions, even though Ethiopia does not really have lots of resources to burn and destroy.

Unfortunately, the Ethiopian people continue to be traumatized by TPLF’s economic gangsterism and government-led violence. Traumatism leads to hopelessness, extreme anger and frustration, to the extent of being self-destructive. The burnings of properties, therefore, are byproducts of the traumas that the Oromos have suffered. I have my deep fears that someday such destructiveness may repeat themselves in the other regions of the country and possibly in a large scale. Let’s pray and hope that appropriate measures, capable of forestalling the looming dangers

I barely remember a long time ago, Professor Messay had given a speech at Columbia University and I was there to listen his speech, and his speech was not inspiring to me at all. I can not even recollect the topic of his speech, just that he was speaking about the Amhara ruling class but he did not mention the name of Amhara. I could infer this from his speech.

Professor Messay Kebede has subsequently written articles on the current Oromos students uprising in which he urges that the Amharas should join the Oromos’ students protests against the Addis Ababa master plan. Of course, it is everybody’s desire that Oromo and Amhara should be united to end the cruel TPLF tyranny regime. Indeed, Oromos can not win alone against the TPLF; Amhara’s participation is very crucial and effective to bring down the TPLF government. It is true that as J.K. Rowling stated, “we are only as strong as we are united, as weak as we are divided.”

However, I assiduously read his last rebuttal titled “Then and Now: A Rejoinder to my Critics.” Professor Messay seemed disenchanted with Amharas because they did not join the Oromos’ students uprising in Ethiopia. He further said, “ነገ በኔ ነው”

I just would like to remind Professor Messay that, since TPLF came to power, the Amharas have been isolated and targeted for the last 25 years, and certainly, Messay is very aware of what Woyanne did and is still doing to Amharas. I wish the Professor had written similar article criticizing the TPLF/OLF regards to the 1992 mass slaughters of pregnant women and children in Arbagugu and in Bedno where the worst crimes ever committed on the Amharas since Mussolini’s aggression in 1935. Not even long ago in Gura Ferda and in Benishangul, the Amharas were expelled by TPLF surrogates and the Professor did not write any article denouncing these horrendous crimes. I am dumbfounded that the Professor jumps to accusing Amharas not being participated in the Oromos students protest against the master plan.

Let me briefly attempt to elucidate to Professor two main reasons why the Amharas lack of participating with Oromos’ students protesting against the Addis Ababa master plan. Firstly, Woyane and Shabia sagaciously and systematically designed the ethnic lines of federalism in order to control the country by perpetuating the punitive policies that emphasizing the anti-Amhara ethnic group. This restrain is inimical to the Amharas. Such cunning strategies that enable TPLF to remain in power by creating an envy between ethnic groups, particularly, among Oromo and Amhara. Hypocritically, Woyane tells to Amhara that if Oromo comes to power, your life will be at risk. The same thing, Woyanne tells to Oromo that if Neftegna comes to power again all your properties would be confiscated. So, we are the one who freed you from chauvinist Amhara, and if you try to resist us, you will go back to the system that you had before. Basically, they just made Amhara and Oromo not trust each other.

The second reason is that Woyanne quietly annexed large chunks of land from part of Gondar and Wollo to create greater Tigray. After they confiscated the fertile land (especially from Gondar), the TPLF day one, disarmed the people of Gondar, and started eliminating the original inhabitants of Welkait Tsegede, Humera to replace the Tigraians peasants. Since then, the Tigraians peasants became armed to protect the land in the areas where it was ferociously taken from Welkait Tsegede farmers. The indigenous who resisted the TPLF’s demonic action, were cruelly executed by Woyanne cadres.

Beside this, the whole Amhara regions run by the so called the Amhara National Democratic Movement (as vanguard Amhara party), which purposely created to demonize the Amharas. Realistically speaking, in Oromia region, the people of Oromos are represented by Muktar Kedir and Almaz Mamo who are belonged to Oromo ethnicity, but when it comes to Amhara regions, imagine, the Amharas people are represented by Bereket Simon, Kassa Tekile Berhan, Tsehaye (Tadese Tinqishu), and Helawi Yoseph who are of Tigre ethnicity. These fake Amharas individuals play a big role for Woyanne by quashing the Amhara voices. So, since the Amharas are heavily under controlled and its voices muffled by the ethnic apartheid regime, I don’t see this as an optimal time for Amhara to join the Oromo’s protesting at this point. Professor Messay was supposed to look at the other side of the problem: what Amharas endured under the TPLF rule the last 25 years. These are the main reasons halting the Amhara to join the Oromos’ students protests against the master plan.

In spite of that, I want the viewers to know that I am not trying to instigate the matter for either to reprisal the Amhara on Oromo at this point, I am just trying to acquaint to Professor Messay’s views on why Amharas have not instantly joined the Oromo’s student protests against the master plan.

Having said that, the Professor’s last article insinuates that if the Amhara does not the join the Oromo’s students uprising, there will not be unity in the country because unity is the Amhara’s strong faith and assumedly if the there is no unity, the Amhara’s existence in Ethiopia will be at risk. In other words, as if the only beneficiary out of unity is Amhara. As the matter of fact, he is not the only speaking about these issues. There are quite a few secessionists and anti-Amhara who rant on the same ideas. I’d like to reiterate that the article written by Messay is one sided, threatened, and divisive. The professor knows well that the Amharas have been victimized since the TPLF climbed to power. In his single articles, I have never seen any criticizing or condemnation for the Woyanne’s diabolical crimes against the Amhara ethnic group, and the articles are unbalanced when it comes to the Amharas issues. It is true that the unity of the two large ethnic groups is paramount at this crucial time to bring down the TPLF brutal regime.

To the end, the professor’s article does not entice the vast majority of Amharas at all. Actually, the article reflects, as if the Amhara ethnic group is uninterested on Oromo causes which aggravates the rift between the two ethnicities instead of bringing a reconciliation where these two ethnicities are able live in harmoniously. It will take time to repair the damage done by TPLF. TPLF’s “divide and rule” strategies worked out well for the last 25 years by abetting the extremist to do heinous crimes to innocent Amharas. At the end of the day, Woyanne whatever systems are used to stay in power, it is an inevitable that all ethnicities will ever become united again.

Supporters of killil have attempted to convince the Ethiopian people that ethnic federalism is not only the right system of government for multi-ethnic Ethiopia but that it is also common throughout the world. Ethiopia is not alone, they declare; other countries, specifically India, Switzerland, and Canada, have well functioning ethnic federalisms, they contend. Nothing is farther from the truth.

The claim confuses ethnic federalism with democratic federalism, a failure to distinguish between appearance and substance, façade and content, the nominal and the real. The confusion probably arises from the fact that these countries have a multi-ethnic population and a federal system of government. Some commentators on federalism have also contributed to the confusion when they sometimes use the term “ethnic federalism” casually in describing the political systems in these countries.

The Uniqueness of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism

The difference between ethnic federalism and the federal system of government that exists in these countries is immense. First, they have a democratic form of government, the essential condition for a functioning federalism. Without democracy, there can be no real division of powers between the central and local governments. Nor will there be any protection of individual and minority rights. Just as a fish cannot survive without water, federalism cannot exist without democracy. Federalism under authoritarian rule, for example as it existed in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, under the tight control of the communist party, is not genuine federalism. It is federalism in appearance and authoritarianism in substance, as many scholars have argued.

Second, when establishing their administrative units, none of the three countries used ethnicity to delineate or to name the divisions. India has more than 2000 ethnic groups, but only 29 states and seven territories. Switzerland has three main ethnic groups, German, French, and Italian, but 26 administrative units called cantons. Canada, home to three major groups, the English, the French, and the indigenous people, has 10 provinces and three territories. There are no Bantustan-like ethnic homelands, delineated along ethnic lines, named after ethnic groups, restricted to specific ethnic groups, in any of these countries. (The exception could be the reserves in Canada).

The Absurdity of Ethiopia’s Constitution

Constitutionally, among the community of nations, with or without democratic governance, with or without federalism, Ethiopia stands alone. It is the only country on earth that has bestowed sovereignty on ethnic groups, rather than on the people as a whole. Article 8 of the constitution states that, “All sovereign power resides in the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia”.

I am not a constitutional expert, but to my understanding, the article states that supreme authority in Ethiopia resides with ethnic groups, not with the Ethiopian population as a polity. Article 8 suggests that any ethnic group in a killil, however small it maybe, can exercise its sovereign right and thus affect the economic, political, social, and legal trajectory of a zone, a killil, and even the rest of the country.

And then there is article 39. Article 39 (1) states, “Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”. The constitution details the steps, procedures, and conditions for the separation of the killils from Ethiopia. Here again, Ethiopia is the only country today that has enshrined an article in its constitution to bring about its own destruction. The countries that had included the right to secession in their constitutions in the past, the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, had their wish fulfilled: they both disintegrated.

The constitution not only prescribes a suicide pill for disintegration, but inspires the elites of any ethnic group within an existing killil to strive for killilhood. Using the sovereign right to self-determination granted to ethnic groups in the constitution, the elites of an ethnic group without a killil can demand killilhood or special status in a killil zone so that they can access scarce resources and improve their political standing, as has happened with the Silti in SNNP and Kemant in Amhara regions, resulting in ethnic hostility and reginal instability.

These two constitutional provisions, the sovereignty of ethnic groups and their right to secession, the legal foundations of ethnic federalism, make Ethiopia an outlier. In using divisive ethnic politics, in adopting an aberrant constitution, in instituting a dividing ethnic federalism, Ethiopia stands solo, an outcast among all nations. However, collective rights of ethnic groups, including the right to self-determination without secession, can be protected constitutionally without bestowing sovereign powers on ethnic groups.

Ethnic Federalism Canada is not

When killil supporters cite Canada as a country with ethnic federalism, they are trying to soften, camouflage, conceal the danger it poses to national unity by associating it with a multi-ethnic, tolerant, stable, prosperous, and democratic country. The message: Ethiopia is in good company, no worries, but the reality is that the political system in Ethiopia differs sharply from Canada’s.
To underscore the contrast, I have summarized the major features of ethnic and Canadian federalism in the table below. The differences could not be any starker.

A Summary of the Major Differences between Ethnic and Canadian Federalism

Criterion Ethnic Federalism Canadian Federalism
Rule of Law Nominal Real
Control of administrative units by the central government Excessive, through senior TPLF cadres as “advisors” None
Political independence of the parties governing the administrative unites None, ruled by ethnic parties created by TPLF and enforced by gimgemma Complete
Basis for administrative divisions Ethnicity (except SNNP, Addis Ababa, and Dire Dawa) Geographic
Naming of administrative units Ethnicity (except SNNP, Addis Ababa, and Dire Dawa) Geographic/historical
Legal protection of administrative units at the central level None; House of Federation has no power Yes, through the Senate and the Supreme Court
Protection of individual rights in the administrative unit None Guaranteed
Ethnic identity cards Yes None
Governance Authoritarian Democratic
Sovereignty Ethnic groups The Canadian people
The right to secession Yes No
Political independence of the judiciary None, appointment of political cadres as judges Yes
Military presence in the administrative units for controlling local governments Yes None
Financial dependence of administrative units on central government Heavy, through subsidies and grants Little, through equalization payments formula
Ideological independence of parties in administrative units None, control by the TPLF cadres and gimgemma Yes

Confusion between Ethnicity and Linguistic Groups

I will not discuss the contents of the table in detail, but will highlight the glaring dissimilarities between ethnic and Canadian federalism. Killil supporters claim that Canada has ethnic federalism, mostly probably because the majority of French-speaking Canadians reside in Quebec and the majority of English-speaking Canadians live in the other provinces. Their assertion confuses, intentionally or unintentionally, ethnicity with linguistic groups.

Yes, the majority of the people living in Quebec are French speaking, but they come from diverse ethnic backgrounds, European (French and Belgian), North African, Haitian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, African, indigenous people, and others. And the majority of the people living in the other provinces are English speaking, again from diverse ethnic backgrounds, the English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, German, Ukrainian, Indians, Jewish, Caribbean, indigenous people, other Europeans, and immigrants from all over the world. Hence, in Canada, broadly speaking, there are two major linguistic groups—English and French—but many ethnicities, and no ethnic group called Ontarians, Quebecers, Manitobans, British Columbians.

Protection of Individual Rights

Second, although the Ethiopian constitution bestows sovereign powers on ethnic groups, strangely it provides no protection of individual rights in the killils, but the Canadian Charter of Rights and the Canadian constitution protect both individual and minority rights across Canada, in all the provinces and territories. As a result, the English speaking community of Quebec, composed of different ethnic groups as stated earlier, although it only accounts for about 10% of Quebec’s population, enjoys the right to run its own institutions, schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, and municipalities in English.

Similarly, French-speaking Canadians, living in the rest of Canada, enjoy identical constitutionally guaranteed rights whenever their numbers warrant. Moreover, a French- speaking Canadian living in any of the English-speaking provinces has the right to be tried in French, and an English-speaking person residing in Quebec, in English. In civil cases, individuals have the right to speak either in French or in English before the courts anywhere in Canada. Do such rights exist under Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism?

Are the Amharic-speaking people living in Oromia entitled to their own schools, clinics, and municipalities in Ambo, Adama, Bishoftu, and other cities? Do they have the right to be tried in Amharic or can they speak in Amharic before the courts in civil cases? Do the Oromo people living in the Amhara or Somali region have such rights?

Third, in Canada residence, instead of ethnicity, defines an individual’s legal identity on all official documents and ID cards. A Quebecer is a Canadian citizen of any ethnicity who lives in Quebec. Although an immigrant, I am a Quebecker enjoying the same rights as a native-born Quebecois of French origin, including the right to run for a political office, even the right to become the prime minister of Canada. (Whether I will be or not is a different matter!)

Killil supporters may object to the comparison presented above for being illegitimate, unfair, and unacceptable because of the obvious political divergences between Ethiopia and Canada. That is precisely my point. It is profoundly wrong to call Canadian federalism, ethnic federalism; nonetheless, ethnic federalism, I hope, will evolve into a federalism that resembles Canadian federalism one day, but until then they are as dissimilar as day and night.

Worku Aberra (PhD) is a professor of economics at Dawson College, Montreal, Canada.

Ethiopia has population of almost 100 million. There are several ethnic groups, speaking more than 82 different languages and dialects. The past 25 years TPLF has attempted to legitimize its dictatorial rule, they organized few times fake parliamentary elections. It was not surprising that the result of the election is known before the voting took place. Hence, the elections have not made any difference, as regime continues to rule with iron fist. Democratic principles are nonexistence. The TPLF regime control over the citizen’s life reached unthinkable stage. It has brought human suffering to Ethiopia people. Although the chief architect of the ethnic rule is dead couples years back, his surrogates continue to act in predatory manner. In fact, they are working very hard to establish his personality cult day and night. It appears that there is unwritten decree that every establishment in the country to have a portrait of the “Great leader”. Of course, we should not forget statute, as they say.

The series of demonstrations by students in opposition of the implementation of the secretly prepared master plan by TPLF regime still going on in different locations. The regime acted violently and his loyal troops behaving savagely, killing several unarmed peaceful demonstrates and jailing several thousand protestors. All are held without charges. They also arrested opposition leaders on suspicion of helping anti-regime movement. The regime is locked in a bitter resistance by demonstrators. The regime decided even to bend the rules, playing myriad games to slow down the demonstrators anger, but the problem persisted.

The ethnic centric regime policy that insures Ethiopia to remain weak and divide along ethnic line seems to be on verge of falling apart. The best known ethnic card techniques used to be played by EPDRF become diminishing and outdated. The artificial boundaries created among the nine regions by TPLF’S constitution followed by installing their coalition partners known as EPDRF and supporters throughout the administrative structures is not working as effective as planned either. Most of the coalition members are preoccupied building financial empire by gaining control over money generating institutions. The secretly prepared master plan has been the result of continuing greedy behavior. TPLF is making enemies everywhere and appeared destined to plague Ethiopia with misery. The political future of the country is now more uncertain than any time.

TPLF governing with a heavy hand must end. Ethiopia needs a leading political figure that believes in national unity discourse in good ideals which can minimize the difference among political factions. The country needs conciliatory leaders desperately. It appears the opposition groups have polarized over variety issues. We witness that some of the leader’s attitudes emanate from narrow interest of the group, engaged in fierce hair- splitting arguments, holding adversity on a personal level or wrong conception of others. They need to pull themselves from this habit and to realize that we have a major tasking awaiting us; namely TPLF dictatorial regime. It is high time the opposition political leaders to take initiatives to have the reconciliation process to start. Present concrete condition of Ethiopia calls for this. The reconciliation could be achieve if the opposition leaders of the groups asses the past and present of their own experience to draw a useful conclusion to benefit their own group as well as others. The opposition political groups must overcome factional polarization over petty issues. We the silent majority has no issue among us. The question is when these opposition groups are going to show sign of hope toward reconciliation and agree on a plan of action to replace TPLF’s regime. It was pointed in many ways by many writers their solidarity is critical for struggle. Many are puzzled with the slow process in creating needed solidarity. As many people knew that until they leave behind all “Dysfunctional behavior among Habesha” as outlined by Salaam Yitbarek article, http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1127&context=africancenter_icad_archive

they remain weak and unable to drive the final nail to TPLF ethnic rule. Opposition groups must found a means to end this zero sum game. Let’s stop the endless squabbles and focus to common goals. If opposition groups foster national feeling, and keeping in mind the people interest come first, they can be pioneers of change for Ethiopia freedom.

Logically, one would hope that the Oromo uprising and the undeniable general discontent and frustration in the country call for a serious movement toward a reformist dissent within the TPLF and perhaps the army. In whichever way the present situation is analyzed, it cannot avoid the conclusion that the path so far followed is an impasse and that a change of course is a must. In case some TPLFites are confused about the situation, I remind them that the new occurrence is that the Oromo people have finally overcome their fear. History repeatedly shows that people who have defeated fear cannot be stopped, with the added fact that the recovery of courage is a contagious phenomenon. Such a movement can be temporarily blocked, but it cannot be crushed.

I am not talking about reform because I hope that the TPLF can become democratic and more committed to a policy that protects the interests of Ethiopia and its peoples. That ship has sailed a long time ago. Rather, I expect the TPLF to think of its own interests in a consistently selfish manner, which selfishness points out that the best bet in the mounting uncertainties is to admit, albeit reluctantly, the necessity of reform.

Reason advises the following: lose absolute power to keep some of it! Indeed, the situation contains two choices and two choices only. Either you think that you can protect your interests by pursuing the path of absolute power and repression and run the risk of losing everything by generating a situation of generalized uprising, itself made inevitable by the refusal to concede anything, or you make concessions aimed at sharing power, and you compensate your loss with security and assurance that your interests will be protected. In other words, lose a bit to safeguard what is important, or keep the exclusive control of power and face the danger of losing everything.

Again, be voraciously avid, think only of your interests, and the logic of greed will show you the right way, that is, the way that has a future and provides guarantee. By contrast, the ill option of blind bravado and repression inspired by arrogance and short-sightedness is actually a disguised fear that can only lead to a lose-lose situation for everybody. Make no mistake about it: nobody will win by triggering a civil war in Ethiopia. What awaits us all is a situation comparable to Syria or Libya. Your stubbornness does no more than activate all the ingredients of terrible conflicts that favor nobody.

I understand that some members of the ruling political class are quite aware of the severe shortcomings and dangers of their present policy. That is why we hear them talk here and there of the need for good governance. Unfortunately, to frame the problem in this term is to engage in the path of illusion and postponement. There is no good governance without power sharing and accountability. What you need is not some administrative measures; what you need is political reforms, for the latter are necessary even to apply administrative decisions. And by power sharing I means nothing but the formation of a transitional government representative of all political parties whose main working motto would be the forging of concessions necessary to move forward.

A piece of history lesson: as a rule, history shows that successful and lasting social changes have been initiated and implemented by elites with reformist agendas. The prospect of losing power as a result of a social uprising, guerrilla insurgencies, or war against a more powerful country has led them to see in reforms the best way to stay in power and protect their interests. The other related positive outcome was that their decision to reform avoided wrecking their societies by radical measures and favored a progressive, step by step advancement.

Opposed to this progressive course are movements led by disgruntled and aspiring elites, usually called revolutions, and whose main characteristic is that societies must be put upside down for these elites to find a new legitimacy and model their county in accordance with their sectarian interests. Unsurprisingly, such movements end in dictatorial and often partisan rule, by which alone societies can be made conformable to exclusive elites. While established ruling elites reform societies by opening up and welcoming new strata of people, revolutionary elites have to exclude and close up in order to establish their power. In other words, while the one moves toward the opening of the system to receive newcomers, the other is the newcomer that has to exclude to establish itself.

Ethiopia is the perfect illustration of the destructive process cause by new comers. Because Haile Selassie’s regime was totally unresponsive to repeated calls for reforms, it was wiped out by a revolutionary movement that ended by instituting the dictatorial rule of a military elite inspired by the sectarian ideology of Leninism. Its own reluctance to reform in the face of military defeats and economic failures strengthened guerrilla insurgencies that resulted in its overthrow. Unsurprisingly, instead of following the path of reform by opening the power system, the new comers closed it even more through an ethnic system of selection favoring a policy of divide-and-rule, by which alone the narrow elite claiming to represent Tigrean interests could have the exclusive control of power.
Both the Oromo uprising and the deep discontent of the country clearly demonstrate the failure of the sectarian system established by the TPLF. The moment of decision has come: is the TPLF committed to making the same mistake as Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam or will it finally realize that the system is untenable and that reforms are, willy-nilly, necessary for its own survival? Of course, it is never expected that all those who are influential in the decision-making of the TPLF will admit the necessity of reform. Rather, the question is whether those who are aware of the need can prevail over the conservatives.

I admit my pessimism, but with a touch of uncertainty inspired by the long and almost miraculous survival of Ethiopia against all odds, in particular by its power to resurrect each time it faces existential threat. Indeed, nothing applies better to Ethiopia than what the poet Holderlin said: “Where the danger grows, there also grows the power of salvation.” To give some examples from recent history, when the Era of the Princes threatened the very existence of Ethiopia, there rose Tewodros; when colonialism encircled and threated to draw Ethiopia into the scramble for Africa, there rose Yohannes and Menelik. Will the endurance continue so that it will be said when ethnic exclusion threatened, there rose . . . ?